

CIS Community Defense Model

Version 2.0

Acknowledgments

The Center for Internet Security® (CIS) would like to thank the many security experts who volunteer their time and talent to support the CIS Controls® and other CIS work, especially the Community Defense Model (CDM). CIS products represent the effort of a veritable army of volunteers from across the industry, generously giving their time and talent in the name of a more secure online experience for everyone.

We also acknowledge and greatly appreciate the work of the Verizon Data Breach team, CrowdStrike®, and the many contributors to the MITRE ATT&CK® framework. They are representative of the large community of technical excellence, good will, and open sharing that allows all of us to build greater confidence into the cyber world.

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Executive Summary

This guide is the second edition of the Center for Internet Security® (CIS) Community Defense Model (CDM). The same security experts who help create the CIS Critical Security Controls® (CIS Controls®) work with CIS to apply the CDM to current threat data.

Enterprises that adopt the CIS Controls have repeatedly asked us to identify “What should we do first?” In response, the Controls Community sorted the Safeguards in the CIS Controls into three Implementation Groups (IGs) based on their difficulty and cost to implement.

Implementation Group 1 (IG1), the group that is least costly and difficult to implement, is what we call essential cyber hygiene (formerly basic cyber hygiene) and are the Safeguards we assert that every enterprise should deploy. For enterprises that face more sophisticated attacks or that must protect more critical data or systems, these Safeguards also provide the foundation for the other two Implementation Groups (IG2 and IG3).

Enterprises naturally want to know “How effective are the CIS Controls against the most prevalent types of attacks?” The CDM was created to help answer that and other questions about the value of the Controls based on currently available threat data from industry reports.

Our methodology is straightforward.

The MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK®) framework allows us to express any attack type as a set of attack techniques, which we refer to as *attack patterns*. For each of the five most prevalent attack types, such as ransomware, we collect the corresponding attack patterns through analysis of industry threat data. We then track which Safeguards defend against each of the techniques found in those attack patterns. This methodology allows us to measure which Safeguards are most effective overall for defense across *attack types*.

Our results this year increased our confidence that our conclusions from the first CDM were correct. Based on additional industry threat data sources, the use of the updated version 8 of the CIS Controls and version 8.2 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, we verified that the CIS Controls are effective at defending against 86% of the ATT&CK (sub-)techniques found in the ATT&CK framework. More importantly, the Controls are highly effective against the top five attack types found in industry threat data. The bottom line is that the CIS Controls, and specifically IG1, are a robust foundation for your cybersecurity program.

Our results also confirm that establishing and maintaining a secure configuration process (CIS Safeguard 4.1) is a linchpin Safeguard for all five attack types, which reinforces the importance of configurations, such as those found in the CIS Benchmarks™.

Results Summary


Overall, the findings from this year's CDM both reaffirmed and strengthened, with objective data, what we already thought to be true—IG1 provides a viable defense against the top five attacks.

For CDM v2.0, the top five attack types are: Malware, Ransomware, Web Application Hacking, Insider Privilege and Misuse, and Targeted Intrusions. Our analysis found that, overall, implementing IG1 Safeguards defends against 77% of ATT&CK (sub-) techniques used across the top five attack types. That percentage goes up to 91% if all CIS Safeguards are implemented. These results strongly reinforce the value of a relatively small number of well-chosen and basic defensive steps (IG1) and also support IG1 as the preferred on-ramp to implementing the CIS Controls. We also found that CIS Safeguard 4.1 “Establish and Maintain a Secure Configuration Process” is most effective in defending against the top five attacks, reinforcing the importance of secure configurations, such as those contained within the CIS Benchmarks.

Additionally, independent of any specific attack type, implementing IG1 Safeguards defends against 74%¹ of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques in the MITRE ATT&CK framework, and implementation of all CIS Safeguards defends against 86% of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques in the framework. Since many ATT&CK (sub-)techniques are used across multiple attack types, we can extrapolate that the CIS Controls defend against more than the top five attacks mentioned in this guide.

We also analyzed each attack type individually. As an example, our analysis determined that implementing IG1 Safeguards defends against 78% of Ransomware ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, and implementing all CIS Safeguards defends against 92% of those techniques. This, and other attack pattern findings, can be seen in Figure 1 below. It is worth noting that 100% coverage of all attacker techniques for any attack type is difficult, as some techniques are not able to be defended against. Additionally, some IG1 Safeguards are foundational and process-oriented, such as enterprise and software asset management. While these foundational Safeguards may not be included in the ATT&CK model as defensive measures, they are necessary in order to successfully implement other Safeguards that map to ATT&CK.

Figure 1. CDM v2.0 attack pattern analysis




All percentages are based on ATT&CK (sub-)techniques assigned to an ATT&CK mitigation.

¹ All percentages based on ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that are assigned to an ATT&CK mitigation, and can therefore be defended.

Overview

In this guide, we present the CDM v2.0. Our goal is to bring another level of rigor and detail to support the development and prioritization of the CIS Controls. The CDM process takes data sources (such as the Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR)), drives them into models (such as the MITRE ATT&CK framework), and then translates them into action—creating our best practices (e.g., CIS Controls and CIS Benchmarks). The CDM is continuous, with each cycle starting the process again.

Figure 2. CDM Process



As a part of the CDM process, we use the MITRE Enterprise [ATT&CK framework v8.2](#), the industry-accepted way to describe the individual technical details of a cyber-attack, which provides answers to questions, such as: "Which ATT&CK tactics (the objectives of an attacker) does an attacker use?"; "What are the ATT&CK (sub-) techniques (specific technical actions) used within those tactics?"; and "What are the general ATT&CK mitigations that could help defend against them?" Equally important in the CDM process is using industry threat data (i.e., data sources) of the most prevalent and relevant attacks plaguing enterprises. As part of the CDM process, we research authoritative, industry-recognized data sources, both national and international, which allow us to determine the top five attack types and create comprehensive attack patterns. Our work with the CIS Controls and ATT&CK framework, combined with using authoritative data sources to back our analysis, is the backbone of the CDM.

The CDM was constructed using the following process:

- We mapped CIS Safeguards to the ATT&CK framework.
- We identified the *security function*—independent of any specific attack, the ability of a CIS Safeguard to defend against one or more attacker techniques (e.g., ATT&CK (sub-)techniques).

- Using authoritative data sources, we identified the top five *attack types* that enterprises should defend against. For CDM v2.0, the top five attack types are: *Malware, Ransomware, Web Application Hacking, Insider Privilege and Misuse, and Targeted Intrusions*.
- For each attack type, we used authoritative data sources to determine the *attack pattern*—the set of attacker techniques (e.g., ATT&CK (sub-)techniques) used in each attack type.
- We then identified the *security value*—the benefit of implementing a CIS Safeguard to defend against an individual attack or a group of attacks.

There are several ways that CDM analysis can be used to design, prioritize, implement, and improve an enterprise's security program. Our analysis affirms that enterprises should begin with implementing IG1 first (followed by IG2 and IG3, as appropriate) in order to, at a minimum, defend against the top five attacks. Our CDM v2.0 mappings also provide enterprises with more granularity, if needed. For example, if an enterprise implements CIS Safeguard "4.1–Establish and Maintain a Secure Configuration Process," our mappings can provide a list of ATT&CK (sub-) techniques that the Safeguard defends against. [Attack Cards](#) for each individual attack type, and all attack types combined, are also available on CIS WorkBench, to provide a listing of Safeguards that are the most effective in defending against specific ATT&CK (sub-)techniques.

CIS is dedicated to taking a "community-first" approach. Please join our [CDM Community](#) on CIS WorkBench to take advantage of these and other great resources, as well as to participate in next year's CDM (v3.0).

What's New in CDM v2.0

First, let's recap what we did in v1.0. Released in 2020, v1.0 made use of two publicly-available, authoritative industry resources: the MITRE ATT&CK framework and the Verizon DBIR. To establish the baseline model, a master mapping was created, starting with the 171 CIS Safeguards in CIS Controls v7.1. Following this, CIS Safeguards were mapped to the 41 ATT&CK mitigations in Enterprise ATT&CK v6.3, which MITRE already had mapped to the 266 ATT&CK techniques. This gave us the security function relationship between CIS Safeguards and ATT&CK techniques, identifying the ATT&CK techniques that could be defended against by implementing the CIS Safeguards.

We then selected the five most prevalent attack types (Malware, Ransomware, etc.) from the Verizon DBIR, and the ATT&CK techniques used within those attack types, forming what we call an attack pattern. Using the master mapping of the CIS Safeguards to ATT&CK, we then mapped each ATT&CK technique in the attack pattern back to the relevant CIS Safeguards. This allowed us to analyze the security value of the CIS Safeguards against these five attack types.

To build off of the foundational principles in v1.0, we made a few updates to v2.0, including the following:

- **Updated Version of the CIS Controls.** We used CIS Controls v8 as the basis for our mappings and analysis.
- **Updated Version of the ATT&CK Framework.** We used Enterprise ATT&CK v8.2, which is made up of 178 ATT&CK techniques, 352 ATT&CK sub-techniques (530 combined "ATT&CK (sub-)techniques"), and 42 ATT&CK mitigations. Note that the term "ATT&CK (sub-)techniques" is used throughout this guide to refer to ATT&CK techniques and ATT&CK sub-techniques as a whole, unless otherwise indicated.
- **Additional Data Sources Added.** We used several additional national and international data sources, such as the *2020 Verizon DBIR*, *ENISA Threat Landscape—The Year in Review*, and more, to determine the top five attacks. Additional data sources were used in CDM v2.0 to create more comprehensive attack patterns. A full listing of data sources used to identify attack types and create attack patterns can be found [here](#).²
- **Updated Master Mapping.** We mapped at the ATT&CK (sub-)technique level, in order to provide more granularity and clarity for our analysis. ATT&CK mitigations were used as a guide to map to the ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, which allowed us to select the specific ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that can be defended against through the implementation of one or more CIS Safeguards.

Glossary

The following are terms used throughout this guide and their specific meanings:

ATT&CK (sub-)technique	The combination of ATT&CK techniques and ATT&CK sub-techniques. Collectively referred to as ATT&CK (sub-) techniques, there are 530 in total for Enterprise ATT&CK v8.2.
ATT&CK mitigation	A list of defensive actions that can be taken to defend against an ATT&CK (sub-)technique.
ATT&CK sub-technique	The specific actions that an attacker takes to achieve an ATT&CK tactic, nested within ATT&CK techniques.
ATT&CK tactic	The objectives of an attacker such as reconnaissance, credential access, and exfiltration. A specific set of ATT&CK (sub-) techniques can be found within any given ATT&CK tactic.
ATT&CK technique	The specific actions that an attacker takes to achieve an ATT&CK tactic, listed under each ATT&CK tactic.
Attack pattern	The set of attacker techniques (e.g., ATT&CK (sub-)techniques) required to execute an attack. Attack patterns can change from year to year.
Attack type	The high-level grouping of attacks. For CDM v2.0, they are: Malware, Ransomware, Web Application Hacking, Insider Privilege and Misuse, and Targeted Intrusions.
Attacker techniques	A general term referring to actions that an attacker takes to compromise a system or network that's not assigned to a specific security framework.
CIS Critical Security Controls (CIS Controls)	A set of 18 best practice recommendations that help enterprises focus their resources on the most critical actions to defend against the most prevalent real-life attacks. Each CIS Control consists of a subset of Safeguards.
CIS Safeguards	A set of 153 specific recommendations that make up the CIS Controls. Organized into Implementation Groups, grouped as IG1, IG2, and IG3 Safeguards.
Data source	A threat report, or other dataset, that provides an analysis of attacks, attacker tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), or other specific information related to cybersecurity. Also referred to as industry threat data sources. Used to determine attack types and attack patterns.
Data type	Can be one of multiple categorizations of data that are incorporated into a data source (e.g., self-reported data, sensor data, incident response data, product usage data, and open-source intelligence).
Implementation Group 1 (IG1)	Implementation Group 1, also known as essential cyber hygiene (formerly basic cyber hygiene). IG1 includes defensive actions that are applicable to even the smallest and least-funded enterprises.
Implementation Groups	A simple and accessible way to help enterprises prioritize the implementation of the CIS Controls.
Security function	Independent of a specific attack type, the ability of a CIS Safeguard to defend against one or more attacker techniques (e.g., ATT&CK (sub-)techniques).
Security value	The benefit a CIS Safeguard provides in defending against an individual attack type or a group of attack types.


Methodology

Implementation Groups and the CDM

In CIS Controls v7.1, we introduced a new prioritization scheme referred to as Implementation Groups (IGs). There are three IGs: IG1, IG2, and IG3. To develop the IGs, CIS identified a core set of CIS Safeguards that enterprises with limited resources, expertise, and risk exposure should focus on. This is IG1, or essential cyber hygiene. IG1 includes defensive actions that are applicable to even the smallest and least-funded enterprises. Each IG builds upon the previous one. IG2 identifies additional CIS Safeguards for enterprises with more resources and expertise than those in IG1, and also greater risk exposure. IG3, for enterprises that have the highest level of risk exposure, includes all 153 CIS Safeguards.

The CDM tells us that IG1 defends against the top five attacks. Specifically, the CDM can also help an enterprise focus on which technical IG1 Safeguards are most effective in defending against specific attacks. We at CIS feel that this is a powerful approach to an enterprise's risk management strategy. Additionally, some IG1 Safeguards are foundational and process-oriented, such as enterprise and software asset management. These foundational Safeguards may not be included in the ATT&CK model as defensive measures; however, they must be implemented before the more technical Safeguards that do map to ATT&CK can be properly implemented.

Figure 3. CIS Controls Implementation Group overview



Security Function vs. Security Value

Throughout the CDM v2.0, we focus on two main concepts: the *security function* and the *security value* of the CIS Safeguards. The security function can best be defined as the ability of a CIS Safeguard to defend against one or more ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, independent of any specific attack type. The security function does not necessarily answer the question of why we should implement a particular CIS Safeguard, or the benefit in doing so. Rather, the security function provides the foundation that allows us to analyze the security value, defined as the benefit a CIS Safeguard provides in defending against one or more attack types.


Overall Process

The CDM is comprised of a series of seven steps to get us to the end result. They are:

- 1 Create master mapping.** We created a master mapping from CIS Controls v8 to Enterprise ATT&CK v8.2, mapping the CIS Safeguards to the ATT&CK (sub-)techniques. ATT&CK mitigations were used as a guide to map at the ATT&CK (sub-)technique level.
- 2 Analyze security function.** We analyzed the security function of the CIS Safeguards against ATT&CK (sub-)techniques using the master mapping in Step 1.
- 3 Identify top five attack types.** Using multiple data sources, we identified the five most prevalent attack types experienced by enterprises in 2020-2021: Malware, Ransomware, Web Application Hacking, Insider Privilege and Misuse, and Targeted Intrusions.
- 4 Construct attack patterns.** For each attack type, we used multiple data sources to create comprehensive attack patterns—the set of attacker techniques (e.g., ATT&CK (sub-)techniques) used in an attack type.
- 5 Perform reverse mapping.** We used the master mapping of the CIS Controls to ATT&CK (in Step 1) to map each ATT&CK (sub-)technique associated with an attack type back to the CIS Safeguards.
- 6 Analyze security value.** The reverse mapping allowed us to analyze the security value of implementing the CIS Safeguards against one or more attack types, meaning, how well do the CIS Controls defend against the top five attacks.
- 7 Create visualizations.** The MITRE ATT&CK Navigator allows users to create interactive “layers” of ATT&CK. This tooling allowed us to visualize each attack pattern individually and combined across all attack types. These layers can be found on CIS WorkBench [here](#).

The detailed CDM process can be seen below in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Detailed CDM Process



ATT&CK Structure

In order to fully understand the CDM methodology, it is fundamental to understand how the ATT&CK framework is organized and interconnects. The highest level within ATT&CK is called a tactic. These are, as previously mentioned, the objectives of an attacker, such as reconnaissance, credential access, and exfiltration. There are 14 tactics in ATT&CK v8.2, represented with a "TA" before their unique identifier. Each ATT&CK tactic contains multiple ATT&CK *techniques*, which contain ATT&CK *sub-techniques*, where applicable. ATT&CK (sub-)techniques are the specific actions that an attacker takes to achieve an ATT&CK tactic. They are represented with a "T" before their unique identifier, with ATT&CK sub-techniques having ".0XX" after the main unique identifier. There are 530 ATT&CK (sub-)techniques in total for v8.2.


ATT&CK also has *mitigations*, each including several ATT&CK (sub-)techniques. ATT&CK mitigations provide a list of actions that can be taken to defend against a specific ATT&CK (sub-)technique. The ATT&CK mitigations begin with the letter “M” followed by a unique identifier (e.g., M1047). There are 42 ATT&CK mitigations in v8.2. It is worth noting that ATT&CK techniques and their child sub-technique(s) do not always map back to the same ATT&CK mitigation. For example, “M1036–Account Use Policies” mitigates against “T1110–Brute Force,” which has four ATT&CK sub-techniques. However, the mitigation M1036 is effective against only three of the four (sub-)techniques (T1110.001, T1110.003, and T1110.004), as indicated on the ATT&CK website. This warranted us to map at the ATT&CK (sub-)technique level for the CDM master mapping for accuracy.

It is important to note that out of the 530 ATT&CK (sub-)techniques in v8.2, 84 have no assignment to an ATT&CK mitigation, meaning that no matter what security framework is being implemented, these 84 ATT&CK (sub-)techniques cannot be easily mitigated, based on information provided on the ATT&CK website. An example of one of these ATT&CK (sub-)techniques is “T1546–Event Triggered Execution,” which “cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features,” according to the [ATT&CK website](#). Our assessment of these ATT&CK (sub-)techniques found that the majority are used in what is often referred to as “Living off the Land (LotL)” attacks, where attackers use existing tools and tactics on the targeted system or network to carry out an attack, rather than exploit a specific system or control weakness; these attacks are therefore difficult to defend against. Unless otherwise noted, all calculations in this guide do not take into account these ATT&CK (sub-)techniques. Additional information on ATT&CK v8.2 can be found on the [ATT&CK website](#).

Mapping Relationships

As part of Step 1 of the CDM process, the CIS Safeguards are mapped to ATT&CK mitigations and then to ATT&CK (sub-)techniques. Ultimately, this high-level mapping (from CIS Safeguards to ATT&CK mitigations) serves as the guide for connecting CIS Safeguards to ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, and therefore it is worthwhile to analyze both: how well the CIS Safeguards map to ATT&CK mitigations and then to ATT&CK (sub-)techniques. The CIS Safeguard mapping to ATT&CK is available separately from this guide on [CIS WorkBench](#) and via the [CIS website](#). Figure 5 below demonstrates the mapping relationship. It should be noted that the mapping creates a many-to-many relationship between CIS Safeguards and ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, meaning that implementing a single CIS Safeguard defends against multiple ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, and a single ATT&CK (sub-)technique can be defended through implementation of one or more CIS Safeguards.

Figure 5. Mapping relationship between CIS Safeguards and ATT&CK



It is worth noting that the ATT&CK mitigations represent defensive cybersecurity actions at a different level of abstraction than the CIS Safeguards. The CIS Safeguards cover a larger number of defensive cybersecurity concepts than the ATT&CK mitigations. This difference in granularity is perhaps best demonstrated through the number of defensive actions within each collection: CIS Controls v8 contains 153 CIS Safeguards, whereas ATT&CK v8.2 contains 42 ATT&CK mitigations.

How to Use This Document

For those looking to understand more about the CDM process, this guide is a perfect start to give readers:

- An overview of how the CDM works
- An explanation for why the CDM is helpful to build an enterprise's cybersecurity program
- A high-level overview of results from this year's CDM
- An in-depth analysis of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that can be defended against through implementation of the CIS Safeguards, overall and for each attack type
- Additional links and resources

For those who wish to dive deeper into the CDM, we also provide the following:

- **CDM Master Mapping:** A Microsoft® Excel® spreadsheet containing³:
 - CIS Controls v8 to ATT&CK mapping: High-Level (to ATT&CK mitigations)
 - CIS Controls v8 to ATT&CK mapping: Low-Level (to ATT&CK (sub-)techniques)
- **ATT&CK Visualizations:** JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) files for each attack type, as well as one for all attack types combined⁴
 - A guide on how to visualize these JSON files
- **CDM Attack Cards:** IG1 Safeguards to implement for each attack type and all attack types combined (in terms of effectiveness)⁵
- **CDM Reverse Mapping:** A reverse mapping that provides which ATT&CK (sub-) techniques can be defended by implementing one or more CIS Safeguards, as well as which attack type(s) they defend against⁶.

Please join our [CDM Community](#) on CIS WorkBench to take advantage of these and other great resources.

³ Found [here](#): Note that a CIS WorkBench account is needed to obtain these files (free). Microsoft® Excel® workbooks are in database-friendly formats.

⁴ Found [here](#): Note that a CIS WorkBench account is needed to obtain these files (free). JSON files can be imported into MITRE's ATT&CK Navigator tool [here](#)

⁵ Found [here](#): Note that a CIS WorkBench account is needed to obtain this file (free).

⁶ Found [here](#): Note that a CIS WorkBench account is needed to obtain this file (free).

Security Function Analysis

ATT&CK Mitigations

The first step in determining the security function of the CIS Safeguards is to map the CIS Safeguards to the ATT&CK mitigations. Note that a single Safeguard can map to multiple ATT&CK mitigations and vice versa.

All CIS Safeguards

Overall, the CIS Safeguards mapped to 93% of ATT&CK mitigations, or 39 out of 42. Table 1 below shows the top 10 ATT&CK mitigations that mapped to CIS Safeguards. For example, "M1047-Audit" is mapped to 23 CIS Safeguards, indicating that those 23 Safeguards perform some form of auditing activity, and therefore have the ability to defend against one or more ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that are contained within the Audit mitigation. Analysis found that "M1047-Audit" ranked #1 again this year with the most mappings, emphasizing the importance of implementing best practices, such as secure configurations (e.g., CIS Benchmarks), and auditing those configurations.

Table 1. Number of CIS Safeguards mapped to the top 10 ATT&CK mitigations

Rank	ATT&CK Mitigation ID	ATT&CK Mitigation Name	Number of ATT&CK Mitigations Mapped to CIS Safeguards
1	M1047	Audit	23
2	M1051	Update Software	19
3	M1016	Vulnerability Scanning	17
4	M1018	User Account Management	16
5	M1026	Privileged Account Management	15
6	M1042	Disable or Remove Feature or Program	14
7	M1029	Remote Data Storage	14
8	M1035	Limit Access to Resource Over Network	13
9	M1037	Filter Network Traffic	12
10	M1030	Network Segmentation	10

IG1 CIS Safeguards

In analyzing IG1 Safeguards, it was found that they mapped to 83% of ATT&CK mitigations. Additionally, eight of the ATT&CK mitigations shown in Table 1 above remained in the top 10 for IG1. However, others, such as “M1053–Data Backup,” M1017–User Training,” and “M1022–Restrict File and Directory Permissions,” moved up in rank (since IG1 only focuses on a subset of the CIS Safeguards), as shown below in Table 2.

Table 2. Number of IG1 CIS Safeguards mapped to the top 10 ATT&CK mitigations

Rank	ATT&CK Mitigation ID	ATT&CK Mitigation Name	Number of ATT&CK Mitigations Mapped to CIS Safeguards
1	M1047	Audit	12
2	M1018	User Account Management	11
3	M1029	Remote Data Storage	9
4	M1026	Privileged Account Management	9
5	M1017	User Training	6
6	M1051	Update Software	6
7	M1035	Limit Access to Resource Over Network	6
8	M1030	Network Segmentation	5
9	M1022	Restrict File and Directory Permissions	5
10	M1053	Data Backup	4

Unmapped

Although the majority of ATT&CK mitigations had at least one mapping to a CIS Safeguard, a few mitigations were left unmapped, as shown below in Table 3. For v2.0, we are excited to include an ATT&CK mitigation that was not mapped in v1.0, “M1040–Behavior Prevention on Endpoint.” Prior to CIS Controls v8, Safeguards relating to Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) had not been included. However, we recognized the importance of including Safeguards surrounding EDR in an effort to keep up with the ever-changing threat landscape.

With the addition of CIS Safeguards such as, “13.2–Deploy a Host-Based Intrusion Detection Solution” and “13.7–Deploy a Host-Based Intrusion Prevention Solution,” we were able to successfully map to the ATT&CK mitigation, “M1040–Behavior Prevention on Endpoint.” We also recognized the addition of an ATT&CK mitigation that was not on this list in v1.0, “M1020–SSL/TLS Inspection.” This was due to the retirement of CIS Safeguard (v7.1) 12.10, “Decrypt Network Traffic at Proxy” in v8 of the CIS Controls. While important, we felt that decryption of network traffic may not be appropriate, feasible, or attainable for some enterprises. Additionally, in some cases, privacy requirements/regulations may contradict or interfere with guidance to decrypt all network traffic.

Table 3. ATT&CK mitigations with no mapping to CIS Safeguards

ATT&CK Mitigation ID	ATT&CK Mitigation Name	ATT&CK Mitigation Description
M1019	Threat Intelligence Program	A threat intelligence program helps an organization generate their own threat intelligence information and track trends to inform defensive priorities to mitigate risk.
M1020	SSL/TLS Inspection	Break and inspect SSL/TLS sessions to look at encrypted web traffic for adversary activity.
M1055	Do Not Mitigate	This category is to associate techniques that mitigation might increase risk of compromise and therefore mitigation is not recommended.

All CIS Safeguards

In addition to analyzing at the ATT&CK mitigation level, we also analyzed the mappings at an ATT&CK (sub-)technique level, providing us with a more granular and clarified dataset for analysis. Shown below in Table 4 is a listing of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that had the highest number of CIS Safeguard mappings. At first glance, it may appear that in order to defend against a specific ATT&CK (sub-)technique, it would require the implementation of a significant number of CIS Safeguards. However, this is not the case. Since multiple CIS Safeguards can defend against the same ATT&CK (sub-)technique, this provides enterprises with multiple options to select the Safeguards that are most appropriate to implement for their environment. Multiple Safeguards mapping to an ATT&CK (sub-)technique also helps to illustrate defense-in-depth.

“T1021.001-Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)” had the highest number of CIS Safeguards mapped to it, emphasizing the potential that the CIS Safeguards can provide in protecting RDP. Get the CIS RDP guide [here](#).

Overall, out of 446 ATT&CK (sub-)techniques assigned to an ATT&CK mitigation, 383, or 86%, can be defended against through implementation of all CIS Safeguards. Additional analysis found that almost half of the ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, shown in Table 4 below, related to the exploitation of an external application, protocol, etc., emphasizing the importance of securing externally-facing systems. It also is worth noting that ATT&CK sub-technique “T1021.001-Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)” had the highest number of CIS Safeguards mapped to it, demonstrating the potential that the CIS Safeguards can provide in protecting RDP. Recently, CIS released a [guide](#) about RDP, a protocol attackers often exploit, and which direct mitigations can be implemented to defend against an RDP-based attack.

Table 4. ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that had the highest number of CIS Safeguard mappings

Rank	ATT&CK (Sub-) Technique ID	ATT&CK (Sub-)Technique Name	Number of CIS Safeguards Mapped to an ATT&CK (Sub-)Technique
1	T1021.001	Remote Desktop Protocol	42
2	T1563.002	RDP Hijacking	41
3	T1552	Unsecured Credentials	39
4	T1072	Software Deployment Tools	38
5	T1210	Exploitation of Remote Services	35
6	T1190	Exploit Public-Facing Application	33
7	T1059	Command and Scripting Interpreter	30
8	T1557	Man-in-the-Middle	29
9	T1530	Data from Cloud Storage Object	28
10	T1574	Hijack Execution Flow	27
11	T1003	OS Credential Dumping	25
12	T1133	External Remote Services	24
13	T1543.002	Systemd Service	24
14	T1563	Remote Service Session Hijacking	24
15	T1059.001	PowerShell	24
16	T1021.005	VNC	23
17	T1542.005	TFTP Boot	23
18	T1548	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	22
19	T1602.001	SNMP (MIB Dump)	22
20	T1543	Create or Modify System Process	22

IG1 CIS Safeguards

Overall, out of the ATT&CK (sub-)techniques assigned to an ATT&CK mitigation (446), IG1 Safeguards defend against 74% (332). This shows that by implementing IG1 alone, enterprises can defend against the majority of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques. Additionally, it is worth noting that some IG1 Safeguards are foundational and process-oriented, such as enterprise and software asset management. These foundational Safeguards may not be included in the ATT&CK model as defensive measures, due to the technical nature of the ATT&CK framework; however, many are pre-requisites to successfully implement the more technical Safeguards that do map to ATT&CK.

Table 5. ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that had the highest number of IG1 Safeguard mappings

Rank	ATT&CK (Sub-) Technique ID	ATT&CK (Sub-)Technique Name	Number of CIS Safeguards Mapped to an ATT&CK (Sub-)Technique
1	T1552	Unsecured Credentials	22
2	T1021.001	Remote Desktop Protocol	21
3	T1543.002	Systemd Service	20
4	T1563.002	RDP Hijacking	20
5	T1072	Software Deployment Tools	20
6	T1530	Data from Cloud Storage Object	19
7	T1530.006	Systemd Timers	18
8	T1574	Hijack Execution Flow	16
9	T1078.004	Cloud Accounts	16
10	T1543	Create or Modify System Process	16
11	T1601.002	Patch System Image	15
12	T1548	Forge Web Credentials	15
13	T1601	Downgrade System Image	15
14	T1569	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	15
15	T1098	Modify System Image	15
16	T1003	System Services	15
17	T1053.002	Account Manipulation	14
18	T1599	OS Credential Dumping	14
19	T1021.002	At (Windows)	14
20	T1599.001	Domain Policy Modification	14

Unmapped

While the majority of the ATT&CK (sub-)techniques can be defended against by one or more CIS Safeguards, 63 ATT&CK (sub-)techniques did not map back to a CIS Safeguard. Many of these ATT&CK (sub-)techniques are listed under ATT&CK mitigations that did not map to a CIS Safeguard, such as “M1055–Do Not Mitigate,” “M1020–SSL/TLS Inspection,” and “M1019–Threat Intelligence Program.” Several ATT&CK (sub-)techniques from “M1056–Pre-compromise” were also among those that were unmapped. A listing of these ATT&CK (sub-)techniques can be found in [Appendix D](#) of this guide.

Additionally, the 84 ATT&CK (sub-)techniques with no assignment to an ATT&CK mitigation can be found in [Appendix E](#) of this guide. Our assessment of these ATT&CK (sub-)techniques found that the majority are used in LotL attacks, where an attacker uses existing tools and tactics on the targeted system or network to carry out an attack, rather than exploit a specific system or control weakness; these attacks are therefore difficult to defend against.

All CIS Safeguards

In addition to the analysis above, we also analyzed the reverse—which CIS Safeguards defend against one or more ATT&CK (sub-)techniques. Our mapping revealed that out of 153 CIS Safeguards, 68% defend against one or more ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, with 19 CIS Safeguards defending against 50 or more ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, as shown below in Table 6.

We can see that CIS Safeguard “4.1–Establish and Maintain a Secure Configuration Process” defends against the highest number of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, once again reinforcing the importance of secure configurations, such as those contained within the CIS Benchmarks.

Table 6. CIS Safeguards that had the highest number of mapped ATT&CK (sub-)techniques

Rank	CIS Safeguard	CIS Safeguard Title	Number of ATT&CK (Sub-) Techniques Defended by a CIS Safeguard	IG1	IG2	IG3
1	4.1	Establish and Maintain a Secure Configuration Process	342	✓	✓	✓
2	6.1	Establish an Access Granting Process	217	✓	✓	✓
3	6.2	Establish an Access Revoking Process	217	✓	✓	✓
4	18.3	Remediate Penetration Test Findings	214		✓	✓
5	6.8	Define and Maintain Role-Based Access Control	206			✓
6	4.7	Manage Default Accounts on Enterprise Assets and Software	188	✓	✓	✓
7	18.5	Perform Periodic Internal Penetration Tests	187			✓
8	5.4	Restrict Administrator Privileges to Dedicated Administrator Accounts	164	✓	✓	✓
9	5.3	Disable Dormant Accounts	155	✓	✓	✓
10	2.5	Allowlist Authorized Software	101		✓	✓
11	2.7	Allowlist Authorized Scripts	81			✓
12	3.3	Configure Data Access Control Lists	75	✓	✓	✓
13	4.2	Establish and Maintain a Secure Configuration Process for Network Infrastructure	73	✓	✓	✓
14	2.3	Address Unauthorized Software	67	✓	✓	✓
15	4.4	Implement and Manage a Firewall on Servers	60	✓	✓	✓
16	4.8	Uninstall or Disable Unnecessary Services on Enterprise Assets and Software	54		✓	✓
17	13.8	Deploy a Network Intrusion Prevention Solution	53			✓
18	13.3	Deploy a Network Intrusion Detection Solution	53		✓	✓
19	12.2	Establish and Maintain a Secure Network Architecture	51		✓	✓
20	5.2	Use Unique Passwords	47	✓	✓	✓

IG1 CIS Safeguards

Overall, it was found that 86% of IG1 Safeguards defend against one or more ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, with many defending against 60 or more, as shown below in Table 7. This reinforces that implementing a relatively small set of defensive actions (IG1) provides an enterprise with the ability to defend against a wide array of potential attacks.

As previously mentioned, some of the IG1 Safeguards do not directly map to the ATT&CK framework. These are considered foundational Safeguards, such as keeping inventory of enterprise assets and software (CIS Controls 1 and 2) and implementing logging (CIS Control 8). These foundational Safeguards are important, since without them, there is no way of knowing which devices are, or could be, compromised.

These foundational Safeguards may not be included in the ATT&CK model as defensive measures; however, they must be implemented before more technical Safeguards that do map to ATT&CK can be properly implemented.

Table 7. IG1 Safeguards that had the highest number of mapped ATT&CK (sub-)techniques

Rank	CIS Safeguard	Title	Number of ATT&CK (Sub-) Techniques Defended by a CIS Safeguard
1	4.1	Establish and Maintain a Secure Configuration Process	342
2	6.1	Establish an Access Granting Process	217
3	6.2	Establish an Access Revoking Process	217
4	4.7	Manage Default Accounts on Enterprise Assets and Software	188
5	5.4	Restrict Administrator Privileges to Dedicated Administrator Accounts	164
6	5.3	Disable Dormant Accounts	155
7	3.3	Configure Data Access Control Lists	75
8	4.2	Establish and Maintain a Secure Configuration Process for Network Infrastructure	73
9	2.3	Address Unauthorized Software	67
10	4.4	Implement and Manage a Firewall on Servers	60
11	5.2	Use Unique Passwords	47
12	6.5	Require MFA for Administrative Access	33
13	6.4	Require MFA for Remote Network Access	31
14	7.1	Establish and Maintain a Vulnerability Management Process	27
15	7.2	Establish and Maintain a Remediation Process	27
16	11.3	Protect Recovery Data	27
17	14.1	Establish and Maintain a Security Awareness Program	25
18	7.3	Perform Automated Operating System Patch Management	24
19	11.4	Establish and Maintain an Isolated Instance of Recovery Data	20
20	6.3	Require MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications	17

Unmapped

In total, 49 CIS Safeguards were not mapped to ATT&CK, only eight of which were IG1 Safeguards. As previously mentioned, some of these unmapped Safeguards are foundational Safeguards, such as “CIS Control 8: Audit Log Management” and “CIS Control 3: Data Protection.” Other Safeguards, such as those in “CIS Control 15: Service Provider Management” and “CIS Control 17: Incident Response Management,” as examples, are also not specifically addressed by any of the ATT&CK mitigations in the ATT&CK framework, and therefore are unable to be mapped.

A list of unmapped CIS Safeguards can be found in [Appendix F](#) of this guide.

Data Source Analysis

After determining the security function of the CIS Safeguards, based on their mapping to ATT&CK, we then determined the top five attack types and attack patterns. First, we selected the most common attack types that enterprises should defend against, through reviewing various data sources. Attack types are the high-level grouping of attacks. For v2.0, they are: Malware, Ransomware, Web Application Hacking, Insider Privilege and Misuse, and Targeted Intrusions.

Following this, we used additional data sources to determine the attack pattern—the set of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques required to execute the attack. Attack patterns are constructed with the most recent attacker techniques and can change from year to year. Lastly, we leveraged the master mapping to ATT&CK, to perform a reverse mapping back to the CIS Safeguards, which allowed us to analyze the security value of the Safeguards.

Data Types

Each year, multiple data sources (i.e., industry threat data sources) are published that contain various metrics, such as top malware, top ransomware, top attack types, etc. The data behind these reports contains valuable information and can be categorized into one of the following data types, all of which the CDM leverages:

- **Self-Reported Data:** Analysts and researchers are employed to contact companies and obtain first-hand information about how breaches occurred.
- **Sensor Data:** Vendors offering network and other types of cybersecurity monitoring or prevention services have access to raw network and other types of data.
- **Incident Response Data:** Created from incident response activities, the data obtained here is often rich and extremely granular; however, it may be unstructured and is provided in narrative form.
- **Product Usage Data:** Vendors offering software-as-a-service and cloud-based products may gather security-relevant data for customers using their products.
- **Open-Source Intelligence:** Information available from sources such as intelligence reports, publicly-available incident response reports, and other security-related publications.

In addition to data type, the longevity of the report and access to underlying datasets are also taken into consideration.

If you're a vendor with data that fits into one or more categories, please contact us at controlsinfo@cisecurity.org.

Attack Type Data Sources

We evaluated multiple data sources to determine the top five attack types, as shown below in Table 8.

Table 8. Attack type data sources

Data Source	Publish Date	Type	Longevity	CIS Access to Underlying Data
Verizon DBIR	May 19, 2020	Self-reported data, Sensor data, Incident response data	2008	No ⁷
IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index	February 24, 2021	Sensor data, Incident response data	2017	No
ENISA Threat Landscape – The Year in Review	October 20, 2020	Open-source intelligence	2012	No
CrowdStrike Services Cyber Front Lines Report	2020	Sensor data, Incident response data, Product usage data	2020	No
Akamai The State of the Internet: A Year in Review	2020	Sensor data, Product usage data	2008	No

Several sources were reviewed and some carried a heavier weight, such as the 2020 Verizon DBIR, since their dataset encompasses several different data sources, both public and private, and is based on multiple data types. As data sources may change from time to time, we are confident that our analysis and the data that backs it provides enterprises with the knowledge they need to put forth a robust security program and protect against the most pervasive cyber threats.

Top Attack Types

The top attack types for v2.0 are shown below in Table 9, in order of prevalence. The attack types remain unchanged from v1.0; however, the rank has changed, based on the cumulative analysis of the various data sources listed above in Table 8.

With these attack types, there is likely to be some overlap (e.g., a nation-state attacker that is working as an insider, a targeted intrusion attack that uses malware). However, every effort is made to group these top attack types into categories that have valuable data sources to determine their respective attack patterns. Therefore, some top attack types, such as general, non-specific categories (e.g., everything else, other, etc.) or a category that cannot be easily mitigated (e.g., Denial of Service (DoS), stolen assets, etc.), were not considered.

Table 9. Top 5 attack types for CDM v2.0

Rank	Attack Type	Change from CDM v1.0
1	Malware	Moved up in rank
2	Ransomware	Moved up in rank
3	Web Application Hacking	Moved down in rank
4	Insider Privilege and Misuse	Moved down in rank
5	Targeted Intrusions	Rank remained the same

The following sections briefly describe each attack type and the justification for inclusion.

⁷ However, the Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) Community Database (VCDB) is a random sample of only public breaches and is available at: <https://github.com/vz-risk/VCDB>. This data is a part of the larger DBIR dataset.

Malware ranked #1 in ENISA's The Year in Review 2020 report.

According to Bitdefender's 2020 Mid-Year Threat Landscape Report, there was a 715.08% increase in ransomware reports across the globe.

Malware

Malware continues to plague enterprises year after year. The Verizon DBIR describes malware as *"...the common type of commodity malware that everyone has probably seen on some email claiming to be a fax or a missed delivery package. These incidents and breaches tend to be opportunistic and financially motivated."* (Verizon DBIR, 2020).⁸ The DBIR refers to this attack type as "crimeware," which includes malware that did not fall into another attack type. According to the 2020 DBIR, malware ranked #4 in breaches and #2 in incidents (Verizon DBIR, 2020). Malware continues to affect enterprises globally, as malware ranked #1 in ENISA's The Year in Review 2020 report (ENISA, 2020)⁹. Each month, the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center[®] (MS-ISAC[®]) publishes the Top 10 Malware impacting SLTTs, a data source also used in the CDM.

Ransomware

Ransomware involves the encryption of files on a system or network, rendering them useless until a decryption key is used or backups are restored. Ransomware has taken its toll across all sectors over the years, and the threat continues to grow into 2021. According to the 2020 DBIR, 27% of malware incidents were categorized as ransomware (Verizon DBIR, 2020). Due to the differences in attacker tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and motives, we separated Ransomware from the Malware attack type. According to IBM's 2021 X-Force Threat Intelligence Index report, ransomware ranked as their number one threat type, totaling 23% of their X-Force[®] caseload (IBM X-Force, 2021)¹⁰. Additionally, X-Force estimated a staggering profit of \$123 million from just one of the ransomware groups, Sodinokibi (aka REvil) (IBM X-Force, 2021). According to Bitdefender's 2020 Mid-Year Threat Landscape Report, there was a 715.08% increase of ransomware reports across the globe (Bitdefender, 2020)¹¹. These findings stress the importance of protecting against ransomware attacks, as no one sector is immune.

Web Application Hacking

The DBIR defines this as "anything that has a web application as the target." Over 80% of breaches involved some type of web application hacking, according to the 2020 Verizon DBIR. Additionally, web applications were ranked #1 for breaches and #4 for incidents (Verizon DBIR, 2020). When it comes to the cloud, the report also states that 73% of the time, cloud-based breaches attacked an email or web application server, stressing the importance of protecting both on-premises and cloud assets (Verizon DBIR, 2020). It should come as no surprise that externally-facing applications are much more vulnerable to an attack, especially for those with misconfigurations and protocols that are left open and unprotected. At the top of the list for web application attacks are "Injections" (e.g., SQL, NoSQL, etc.) and "Cross-site Scripting (XSS)," according to the OWASP[®] Top 10¹² and 2020 CWE Top 25¹³, respectively.

8 2020 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) <https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/dbir/2020/introduction/>

9 ENISA Threat Landscape—The Year in Review (Published October 20, 2020) <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/year-in-review>

10 IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2021 <https://www.ibm.com/security/data-breach/threat-intelligence>

11 Bitdefender Mid-Year Threat Landscape Report 2020 <https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/366/Bitdefender-Mid-Year-Threat-Landscape-Report-2020.pdf>

12 OWASP Top 10 <https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>

13 2020 CWE Top 25 https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2020/2020_cwe_top25.html

Insider Privilege and Misuse

Insider Privilege and Misuse can be defined as incidents that are intentionally carried out by an insider, according to the 2020 Verizon DBIR. These are incidents where the insider has malicious intent to cause harm. According to the 2021 IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Report, “25% of attacks against transportation in 2020 involved a malicious insider or misconfiguration.” Additionally, out of the 13% of insider threat incidents in the industrial control systems (ICS) and operational technology (OT) fields, 60% involved insiders with malicious intent (IBM X-Force, 2021).

Targeted Intrusions

This attack type includes nation-state activity or state-affiliated actors that are looking for the crown jewels, such as an enterprise’s data (Verizon DBIR, 2020). Additionally, the intent of Targeted Intrusions differs from other patterns, focusing on social, economic, and political gain. The 2020 DBIR states that these types of attacks typically focus on the social and malware vectors of the VERIS framework, with 81% using phishing and 92% using malware (Verizon DBIR, 2020).

Attack Pattern Data Sources

Once the top attack types were determined, data sources were selected in a similar fashion to create comprehensive attack patterns. Attack patterns are the selection of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that are used in a given attack type. We focus on the most common and recently used techniques to form the attack patterns, as patterns can and will change from year to year. Several data sources were used to create the attack patterns, which can be seen in Table 10 below.

Table 10. Data sources used to create attack patterns (for each attack type)

Attack Type	Attack Pattern Data Source
Malware	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center® (MS-ISAC®) Top 10 Malware CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report¹⁴ IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2021 ESET Threat Report Q4 2020¹⁵ Check Point 2021 Cyber Security Report¹⁶
Ransomware (as a subset of Malware)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Data CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2021 Group-IB Ransomware Uncovered 2020–2021¹⁷ ESET Threat Report Q4 2020
Web Application Hacking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> OWASP Top 10 2020 CWE Top 25
Insider Privilege and Misuse	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Verizon Insider Threat Report 2019¹⁸ Securonix 2020 Insider Threat Report¹⁹ G-Research Introducing the Insider Attack Matrix²⁰
Targeted Intrusions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report CISA SolarWinds and Active Directory/M365 Compromise Threat Report²¹

14 CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report <https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/global-threat-report/>

15 ESET Threat Report Q4 2020 https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ESET_Threat_Report_Q42020.pdf

16 Check Point 2021 Cyber Security Report <https://www.checkpoint.com/pages/cyber-security-report-2021/>

17 Group-IB Ransomware Uncovered 2020–2021 <https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/ransomware-2021.html>

18 Verizon Insider Threat Report 2019 <https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/insider-threat-report/>

19 Securonix 2020 Insider Threat Report <https://www.securonix.com/resources/2020-insider-threat-report/>

20 G-Research Introducing the Insider Attack Matrix <https://www.gresearch.co.uk/article/introducing-the-insider-attack-matrix/>

21 CISA SolarWinds and Active Directory/M365 Compromise Threat Report: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Supply_Chain_Compromise_Detecting_APT_Activity_from_known_TTPs.pdf

Security Value Analysis

There are several different ways to analyze the security value of the CIS Safeguards against the top five attack types. The next few sections provide an analysis of how well each attack pattern²² is covered by the CIS Safeguards, against ATT&CK tactics and ATT&CK (sub-)techniques. Note that for the ATT&CK tactic analysis, multiple ATT&CK (sub-)techniques can appear across multiple ATT&CK tactics.

Malware

Shown below in Figure 6 is the Malware attack pattern analysis, by IG, across all ATT&CK tactics. Overall, nine of the 14 ATT&CK tactics had 75% or more coverage. Table 11 shows the percentage of Malware ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, within each ATT&CK tactic, that CIS Safeguards defend against.

Figure 6. Malware attack pattern coverage against CIS Safeguards (by IG) across ATT&CK tactics




Table 11. Percentage of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that can be defended against for the Malware attack pattern

Tactic ID	TA0043	TA0042	TA0001	TA0002	TA0003	TA0004	TA0005	TA0006	TA0007	TA0008	TA0009	TA0011	TA0010	TA0040
	60%	0%	100%	100%	83%	89%	78%	86%	29%	100%	38%	96%	100%	40%

94% of ATT&CK (sub-) techniques in the Malware attack pattern can be defended against through implementation of CIS Safeguards.

The Malware attack pattern mapped to 209 unique ATT&CK (sub-)techniques²³, with CIS Safeguards defending against 152 of them. This number may seem low; however, out of the 209 ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, only 162 were assigned to an ATT&CK mitigation, which indicates the highest possible number of techniques that can be defended against across any security framework. Taking this into consideration, it was found that 94% of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques in the Malware attack pattern can be defended against through implementation of the CIS Safeguards, as shown below in Table 12.

Furthermore, out of the 162, 125 ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, or 77%, can be defended through implementation of IG1. This reinforces the security value that IG1 Safeguards can bring to an enterprise to defend against malware.

Table 12. Malware attack pattern data table

# of Mapped ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques	# of ATT&CK (Sub-) Techniques Assigned to an ATT&CK Mitigation	# of ATT&CK (Sub-) Techniques Defended by the CIS Safeguards	% of ATT&CK (Sub-) Techniques Defended by the CIS Safeguards	# of ATT&CK (Sub-) Techniques Defended by IG1 CIS Safeguards	% of ATT&CK (Sub-) Techniques Defended by IG1 CIS Safeguards
209	162	152	94%	125	77%

²² The set of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques required to execute an attack.

²³ Out of 530 total ATT&CK (sub-)techniques

Ransomware

Analysis found that 75% or more of the ATT&CK (sub-)techniques in 10 of the 14 ATT&CK tactics for the Ransomware attack pattern can be defended against through implementation of the CIS Safeguards, as shown below in Figure 7 and Table 13.

Figure 7. Ransomware attack pattern coverage against CIS Safeguards (by IG) across ATT&CK tactics




Table 13. Percentage of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that can be defended against for the Ransomware attack pattern

Tactic ID	TA0043	TA0042	TA0001	TA0002	TA0003	TA0004	TA0005	TA0006	TA0007	TA0008	TA0009	TA0011	TA0010	TA0040
	50%	0%	100%	100%	90%	91%	75%	86%	19%	93%	50%	100%	75%	83%

The Ransomware attack pattern mapped to a total of 229 unique ATT&CK (sub-) techniques (Table 14). Out of the 229, 182 ATT&CK (sub-)techniques were assigned an ATT&CK mitigation, indicating the highest possible number of techniques that can be defended against. Factoring this into the analysis, it was found that CIS Safeguards defend against 92% of the ATT&CK (sub-)techniques. Additionally, IG1 alone defend against 78% of Ransomware ATT&CK (sub-)techniques.

Table 14. Ransomware attack pattern data table

# of Mapped ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques	# of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Assigned to an ATT&CK Mitigation	# of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by the CIS Safeguards	% of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by the CIS Safeguards	# of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by IG1 CIS Safeguards	% of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by IG1 CIS Safeguards
229	182	167	92%	142	78%

Web Application Hacking

Analysis of the Web Application Hacking attack pattern found that the CIS Safeguards defend against 75% or more ATT&CK (sub-)techniques in 11 of the 14 ATT&CK tactics, with six of those ATT&CK tactics having 100% coverage, as shown below in Figure 8 and Table 15.

Figure 8. Web Application Hacking attack pattern coverage against CIS Safeguards (by IG) across ATT&CK tactics




Table 15. Percentage of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that can be defended against for the Web Application Hacking attack pattern

Tactic ID	TA0043	TA0042	TA0001	TA0002	TA0003	TA0004	TA0005	TA0006	TA0007	TA0008	TA0009	TA0010	TA0011	TA0040
	75%	0%	100%	100%	85%	86%	86%	90%	31%	100%	60%	100%	100%	100%

In total, 143 unique ATT&CK (sub-)techniques were mapped to the Web Application Hacking attack pattern (Table 16). Of the 143, 120 ATT&CK (sub-)techniques were assigned to an ATT&CK mitigation and 117, or 98%, are defended through implementation of the CIS Safeguards. Of the 120, IG1 defends against 86% of the ATT&CK (sub-)techniques in this pattern.

Table 16. Web Application Hacking attack pattern data table

# of Mapped ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques	# of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Assigned to an ATT&CK Mitigation	# of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by the CIS Safeguards	% of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by the CIS Safeguards	# of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by IG1 CIS Safeguards	% of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by IG1 CIS Safeguards
143	120	117	98%	103	86%

Insider Privilege and Misuse

Analysis of the Insider Privilege and Misuse attack pattern found that the CIS Safeguards defend against 85% or more of the ATT&CK (sub-)techniques in 10 of the 14 ATT&CK tactics, seven of which have 100% coverage (shown in Figure 9 and Table 17 below).

Figure 9. Insider Privilege and Misuse attack pattern coverage against CIS Safeguards (by IG) across ATT&CK tactics




Table 17. Percentage of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that can be defended against for the Insider Privilege and Misuse attack pattern

Tactic ID	TA0043	TA0042	TA0001	TA0002	TA0003	TA0004	TA0005	TA0006	TA0007	TA0008	TA0009	TA0010	TA0011	TA0040
	0%	0%	100%	100%	100%	100%	85%	87%	30%	100%	40%	90%	100%	100%

Overall, 149 unique ATT&CK (sub-)techniques mapped to the Insider Privilege and Misuse attack pattern, with 112 having an assignment to an ATT&CK mitigation (Table 18). Analysis found that the CIS Safeguards defend against 90% of Insider Privilege and Misuse ATT&CK (sub-)techniques assigned to an ATT&CK mitigation, with IG1 defending against 86% of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques.

Table 18. Insider Privilege and Misuse attack pattern data table

# of Mapped ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques	# of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Assigned to an ATT&CK Mitigation	# of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by the CIS Safeguards	% of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by the CIS Safeguards	# of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by IG1 CIS Safeguards	% of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by IG1 CIS Safeguards
149	112	101	90%	96	86%

Targeted Intrusions

In 10 of the 14 ATT&CK tactics, the CIS Safeguards defend against 75% or more ATT&CK (sub-)techniques associated with the Targeted Intrusions attack pattern, with five of those ATT&CK tactics having 100% coverage (shown in Figure 10 and Table 19 below).

Figure 10. Targeted Intrusions attack pattern coverage against CIS Safeguards (by IG) across ATT&CK tactics




Table 19. Percentage of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that can be defended against for the Targeted Intrusions attack pattern

Tactic ID	TA0043	TA0042	TA0001	TA0002	TA0003	TA0004	TA0005	TA0006	TA0007	TA0008	TA0009	TA0011	TA0010	TA0040
	0%	0%	100%	100%	83%	85%	75%	92%	26%	100%	38%	100%	100%	75%

Overall, 197 unique ATT&CK (sub-)techniques were mapped to the Targeted Intrusions attack pattern (Table 20). Of the 197, 154 were assigned to an ATT&CK mitigation. As a result, CIS Safeguards defend against 95% of the Targeted Intrusions ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, with IG1 defending against 83%.

Table 20. Targeted Intrusions attack pattern data table

# of Mapped ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques	# of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Assigned to an ATT&CK Mitigation	# of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by the CIS Safeguards	% of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by the CIS Safeguards	# of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by IG1 CIS Safeguards	% of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended by IG1 CIS Safeguards
197	154	146	95%	128	83%

Summary

One of the goals of the CDM is to determine the security value of IG1. We determined that an enterprise implementing IG1 can defend itself against the top five attack types. Overall, IG1 defends against 77% or more of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques²⁴. Implementing all of the CIS Safeguards defends against 90% or more of the ATT&CK (sub-)techniques. Shown in Table 21 below are the individual percentages for each attack type, broken down by IG1 Safeguards and all CIS Safeguards.

Table 21. Overall security value analysis

Attack Type	% of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended Against by IG1 CIS Safeguards	% of ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques Defended Against by CIS Safeguards
Malware	77%	94%
Ransomware	78%	92%
Web Application Hacking	86%	98%
Insider Privilege and Misuse	86%	90%
Targeted Intrusions	83%	95%

We also looked at CIS Safeguard coverage for the superset of ATT&CK (sub-) techniques used across all five attack types. Shown below in Figure 11 is the number of ATT&CK (sub-)techniques, by ATT&CK tactic and IG, that the CIS Safeguards defend against. When analyzed, it was found that the CIS Safeguards defend against 77% or more of the ATT&CK (sub-)techniques in 10 of the 14 ATT&CK tactics, as shown in Table 22 below. Also of note, was a particularly low percentage in ATT&CK tactics: TA0007, TA0009, TA0042, and TA0043. This is due to the majority of these ATT&CK (sub-)techniques having no assignment to an ATT&CK mitigation, or assigned, but difficult to defend against (e.g., LotL techniques).

Figure 11. CIS Safeguard coverage (by IG) across all five attack types combined




Table 22. Data table showing number of ATT&CK (sub-) techniques mapped across all five attack types combined

Tactic ID	TA0043	TA0042	TA0001	TA0002	TA0003	TA0004	TA0005	TA0006	TA0007	TA0008	TA0009	TA0011	TA0010	TA0040
	45%	0%	100%	100%	86%	88%	77%	90%	29%	95%	52%	92%	97%	86%

²⁴ Assigned to an ATT&CK mitigation

Additionally, we created “attack cards” for each attack type, which provide a list of IG1 CIS Safeguards, in order of effectiveness, along with the corresponding ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that an enterprise will defend against through implementation. These, and other resources, can be found on CIS WorkBench [here](#).

It is worth noting that some ATT&CK (sub-)techniques were mapped to an attack pattern and were assigned an ATT&CK mitigation, but had no mapping to a CIS Safeguard. This list can be found in [Appendix H](#) of this guide.

Lastly, some ATT&CK (sub-)techniques were mapped to an attack pattern, but were not assigned to an ATT&CK mitigation (and therefore, had no mapping to a CIS Safeguard). This list can be found in [Appendix I](#) of this guide.

Conclusion

CDM v2.0 affirms the prioritization of the CIS Critical Security Controls and Implementation Groups. In particular, CDM data backs the premise that all enterprises should start with essential cyber hygiene, or IG1, as a way to defend against the top five attacks.

In summary, our analysis provides us with three key findings:

- **IG1 provides a viable defense against the top five attack types.** Enterprises achieve a high level of protection and are well-positioned to defend against the top five attack types through implementation of essential cyber hygiene, or IG1. These results strongly reinforce the value of a relatively small number of well-chosen and basic defensive steps (IG1). As such, enterprises should aim to start with IG1 to obtain the highest value and work up to IG2 and IG3, as appropriate.
- **Independent of any specific attack type, the CIS Controls are effective at defending against a wide array of attacks.** Specifically, the CIS Controls are effective at defending against 86% of the ATT&CK (sub-)techniques found in the ATT&CK framework. More importantly, the Controls are highly effective against the five attack types found in industry threat data. The bottom line is that the CIS Controls, and specifically IG1, are a robust foundation for your cybersecurity program.
- **Establishing and maintaining a secure configuration process (CIS Safeguard 4.1) is a linchpin Safeguard for all five attack types.** CIS Safeguard 4.1 is most effective in defending against the top five attack types, reinforcing the importance of secure configurations, such as those contained within the CIS Benchmarks.

Join our CDM Community on CIS WorkBench to take advantage of these and other great resources.

CIS is dedicated to taking a “community-first” approach. Further resources can be found on our WorkBench site [here](#). Please join our CDM Community on CIS WorkBench to take advantage of these and other great resources, as well as to participate in next year’s CDM (v3.0).

Closing Notes

As a nonprofit organization driven by its volunteers, we are always in the process of looking for new topics and assistance in creating cybersecurity guidance. If you are interested in volunteering and/or have questions, comments, or have identified ways to improve this guide, please write us at: controlsinfo@cisecurity.org.

All references to tools or other products in this guide are provided for informational purposes only, and do not represent the endorsement by CIS of any particular company, product, or technology.

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Future Work

The CDM is very much a continuous process, and will change as new threats emerge, new technologies are released, and new data is published. Our work is dynamic, and for all the right reasons. Results of this work feed into the evolution of the CIS Controls, as well as other CIS products and services.

For CDM v3.0, we hope to address the following:

- **Additional data sources.** Find additional data sources for the top attack types and patterns. This will help to further strengthen our analysis and provide additional insight to other sectors that may not be represented in the current data sources.
- **Re-categorization of top attack types.** During the writing of v2.0, and after analysis was completed, the 2021 Verizon DBIR was published along with their new categorization for attack patterns (what we call attack types). These attack patterns take a whole new approach to the way that attacks are viewed. We hope to further review the DBIR categorization schemas, as well as other data sources, to continually improve our categorization of attack types.
- **More specific analyses.** As we evolve with future versions of the CDM, our analysis will seek to perform even more in-depth analyses, to answer questions such as: “What is the specific ‘point’ in an attack where it can be thwarted completely?” and “What are the minimal set of Safeguards within IG1 that I need to implement to stop that attack?”
- **More collaboration and correlation.** As CIS Security Best Practices continues to mature our mappings to ATT&CK, we hope to incorporate CIS Benchmark mappings in next year’s CDM.
- **More external stakeholder engagement.** As we all know, CIS is appreciative of our many volunteers within the CIS Community. None of this is possible without all of you. Next year, we will look to collaborate with even more enterprises to enhance and evolve future versions of the CDM.

We believe that future versions of the CDM can also provide a foundation for more detailed and specific analyses. For example, combined with other information (e.g., cost estimates for CIS Safeguards or through using different data sets), we could answer questions, such as:

- What is the most cost-effective way to obtain the security value of IG1?
- How can I make best security use of what I already own before I add technology, expense, and processes?
- If I use attack data that is unique to my industry sector, or threat intelligence that is unique to my company, which Safeguards should I implement to achieve an appropriate defensive strategy?
- Will my defenses be effective at multiple steps or tactics of the attack lifecycle?
- If I know the effectiveness of a specific CIS Safeguard (or its absence), can I intelligently ‘tailor’ my defenses to accommodate specific operational constraints (like the need to run legacy applications)?

We encourage readers to join our communities on [CIS WorkBench](#) to get updates, as well as contribute to future versions of the CDM. Email controlsinfo@cisecurity.org to get information on how to become a community member and more.

APPENDIX A

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ATT&CK (sub-)techniques	ATT&CK techniques + ATT&CK sub-techniques
CDM	Community Defense Model
CISA®	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
CWE	Common Weakness Enumeration
DMARC	Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance
DNS	Domain Name System
DoS	Denial of Service
EDR	Endpoint Detection and Response
ENISA	European Network and Information Security Agency
ESET	Executive Security & Engineering Technologies, Inc.
IBM	International Business Machines Corporation
ICS	Industrial Control Systems
IG	Implementation Group
IG1	Implementation Group 1
JSON	JavaScript Object Notation
LotL	Living off the Land
MBR	Master Boot Record
MFA	Multi-Factor Authentication
MIB	Management Information Base
MS-ISAC	Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center
NIST® CSF	National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework
OS	Operating System
OT	Occupational Technology
OWASP®	Open Web Application Security Project®
RDP	Remote Desktop Protocol
SLTT	State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
SQL	Structured Query Language
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
TFTP	Trivial File Transfer Protocol
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
VERIS Community Database	Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing Community Database
Verizon DBIR	Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report
VNC	Virtual Network Computing
XSS	Cross-Site Scripting

APPENDIX B

Links and Resources

- CIS Controls: <https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/>
- MITRE ATT&CK: <https://attack.mitre.org/>
- CIS Critical Security Controls v8: <https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/v8/>
- CDM v1.0: <https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/cis-community-defense-model/>
- CIS WorkBench: <https://workbench.cisecurity.org/>
- CIS Controls Navigator: <https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-navigator/>
- CIS Controls Guide: Exploited Protocols: Remote Desktop Protocol: <https://www.cisecurity.org/white-papers/exploited-protocols-remote-desktop-protocol-rdp/>
- 2020 Verizon¹ Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR): <https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/dbir/2020/introduction/>
- IBM X-Force² Threat Intelligence Index 2021: <https://www.ibm.com/security/data-breach/threat-intelligence>
- ENISA Threat Landscape – The Year in Review (Published October 20, 2020): <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/year-in-review>
- CrowdStrike Services Cyber Front Lines Report 2020: <https://www.crowdstrike.com/services/cyber-front-lines/>
- Akamai The State of the Internet: A Year in Review 2020: <https://www.akamai.com/our-thinking/the-state-of-the-internet>
- Bitdefender³ Mid-Year Threat Landscape Report 2020: <https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/366/Bitdefender-Mid-Year-Threat-Landscape-Report-2020.pdf>
- Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Top 10 Malware: <https://www.cisecurity.org/ms-isac/>
- CrowdStrike 2021 Global Threat Report: <https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/global-threat-report/>
- ESET Threat Report Q4 2020: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ESET_Threat_Report_Q42020.pdf
- Check Point 2021 Cyber Security Report: <https://www.checkpoint.com/pages/cyber-security-report-2021/>
- Group-IB Ransomware Uncovered 2020–2021: <https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/ransomware-2021.html>
- OWASP Top 10⁴: <https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>
- 2020 CWE Top 25: https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2020/2020_cwe_top25.html
- Verizon Insider Threat Report 2019: <https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/insider-threat-report/>
- Securonix 2020 Insider Threat Report: <https://www.securonix.com/resources/2020-insider-threat-report/>
- G-Research Introducing the Insider Attack Matrix: <https://www.gresearch.co.uk/article/introducing-the-insider-attack-matrix/>
- CISA SolarWinds and Active Directory/M365 Compromise Threat Report: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Supply_Chain_Compromise_Detecting_APT_Activity_from_known_TTPs.pdf

¹ Verizon is a registered trademark of Verizon Trademark Services, LLC.

² IBM and X-Force are registered trademarks of International Business Machines Corporation.

³ Bitdefender is a registered trademark of Bitdefender IPR Management Ltd.

⁴ OWASP is a registered trademark of OWASP Foundation, Inc.

APPENDIX C

Background

The CIS Critical Security Controls (CIS Controls) are a prioritized set of CIS Safeguards to mitigate the most common cyber-attacks against systems and networks. The volunteer experts who develop the CIS Controls come from a wide range of sectors including defense, education, government, healthcare, manufacturing, retail, transportation, and others.

The earliest versions of the CIS Controls were based on the consensus judgment of a relatively small number of experienced people and validated with public feedback from across the industry. The analysis was supported by a simple list of important attacks against which to examine possible CIS Controls. Over more recent versions, CIS has started to develop more data and rigor to underpin the process.

CIS started by working with the emerging marketplace of authoritative summaries of “real world” data about attacks—beginning with the Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) in 2013. After the Verizon® team completed their initial attack analysis, a CIS volunteer team worked with Verizon to map the most important categories or types of attacks seen in the prior year’s data to the CIS Controls, and this map became part of the Verizon DBIR Recommendations. Over the next couple of years, we repeated this process with several other security vendors.

While this approach is useful and based on summaries of data derived by each vendor from their own business model, there were several areas that had to be resolved:

- The vendor reports typically came from marketing departments, so the use of language was inconsistent across vendors and tended to be buzzword heavy
- There was no rigorous way to normalize the data and conclusions across different vendors
- The mapping from summaries and patterns of attack to the CIS Controls was still informal and based on the judgment of relatively few people

In our next step (in 2016), we developed the CIS Community Attack Model as a way to structure the discussion and the mapping from classes of attacks to the CIS Controls. Our goal was to create an open, high-level model in which classes of countermeasures (CIS Safeguards) were organized in two dimensions:

- 1 Steps of the attacker’s lifecycle (similar to the well-known Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain)
- 2 Categories of defensive effect, for which we used the Core Functions of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF)

This approach helped CIS focus on questions like, “What types of countermeasures could help prevent the delivery phase of an attacker’s lifecycle?”

You could also take a strategic view of defense by asking: “Am I over-invested in tools for detecting and preventing the early stages of attack, and under-invested if the initial steps of an attack succeed?”

While it was never fully operationalized, the Community Attack Model was a useful way to structure and capture the discussion about the value of Control selection. Ultimately, the Community Attack Model laid the groundwork for what we now know to be the Community Defense Model.

APPENDIX D

ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques With No Mapping to CIS Safeguards

The following ATT&CK (sub-)techniques were assigned to an ATT&CK mitigation; however, they had no mapping back to a CIS Safeguard.

ATT&CK (sub-) technique ID	ATT&CK (sub-)technique Name	ATT&CK (sub-) technique ID	ATT&CK (sub-)technique Name	ATT&CK (sub-) technique ID	ATT&CK (sub-)technique Name
T1090.004	Domain Fronting	T1586.001	Social Media Accounts	T1591.002	Business Relationships
T1480	Execution Guardrails	T1586.002	Email Accounts	T1591.003	Identify Business Tempo
T1480.001	Environmental Keying	T1587	Develop Capabilities	T1591.004	Identify Roles
T1583	Acquire Infrastructure	T1587.001	Malware	T1592	Gather Victim Host Information
T1583.001	Domains	T1587.002	Code Signing Certificates	T1592.001	Hardware
T1583.002	DNS Server	T1587.003	Digital Certificates	T1592.002	Software
T1583.003	Virtual Private Server	T1587.004	Exploits	T1592.003	Firmware
T1583.004	Server	T1588	Obtain Capabilities	T1592.004	Client Configurations
T1583.005	Botnet	T1588.001	Malware	T1593	Search Open Websites/Domains
T1583.006	Web Services	T1588.002	Tool	T1593.001	Social Media
T1584	Compromise Infrastructure	T1588.003	Code Signing Certificates	T1593.002	Search Engines
T1584.001	Domains	T1588.004	Digital Certificates	T1594	Search Victim-Owned Websites
T1584.002	DNS Server	T1588.005	Exploits	T1596	Search Open Technical Databases
T1584.003	Virtual Private Server	T1588.006	Vulnerabilities	T1596.001	DNS/Passive DNS
T1584.004	Server	T1589	Gather Victim Identity Information	T1596.002	WHOIS
T1584.005	Botnet	T1589.001	Credentials	T1596.003	Digital Certificates
T1584.006	Web Services	T1589.002	Email Addresses	T1596.004	CDNs
T1585	Establish Accounts	T1589.003	Employee Names	T1596.005	Scan Databases
T1585.001	Social Media Accounts	T1590.003	Network Trust Dependencies	T1597	Search Closed Sources
T1585.002	Email Accounts	T1591	Gather Victim Org Information	T1597.001	Threat Intel Vendors
T1586	Compromise Accounts	T1591.001	Determine Physical Locations	T1597.002	Purchase Technical Data

APPENDIX E

ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques With No Mapping to ATT&CK Mitigations

The following are the 84 MITRE ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that had no assignment to an ATT&CK mitigation. As per MITRE, these ATT&CK (sub-)techniques “cannot be easily mitigated with preventative controls since it is based on the abuse of system features,” and therefore had no mapping to a CIS Safeguard (MITRE, 2021)¹.

ATT&CK (sub-) Technique ID	ATT&CK (sub-)technique Name	ATT&CK (sub-) Technique ID	ATT&CK (sub-)technique Name	ATT&CK (sub-) Technique ID	ATT&CK (sub-)technique Name
T1005	Data from Local System	T1069.003	Cloud Groups	T1518.001	Security Software Discovery
T1006	Direct Volume Access	T1070.004	File Deletion	T1526	Cloud Service Discovery
T1007	System Service Discovery	T1070.005	Network Share Conn. Removal	T1529	System Shutdown/Reboot
T1010	Application Window Discovery	T1070.006	Timestomp	T1531	Account Access Removal
T1012	Query Registry	T1074	Data Staged	T1534	Internal Spearphishing
T1014	Rootkit	T1074.001	Local Data Staging	T1542.002	Component Firmware
T1016	System Network Config. Discovery	T1074.002	Remote Data Staging	T1546	Event Triggered Execution
T1018	Remote System Discovery	T1082	System Information Discovery	T1546.001	Change Default File Association
T1020	Automated Exfiltration	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	T1546.005	Trap
T1025	Data from Removable Media	T1087.003	Email Account	T1546.007	Netsh Helper DLL
T1027.001	Binary Padding	T1113	Screen Capture	T1546.012	Image File Exec. Options Injection
T1027.003	Steganography	T1115	Clipboard Data	T1546.015	Component Obj. Model Hijacking
T1027.004	Compile After Delivery	T1120	Peripheral Device Discovery	T1547	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1027.005	Indicator Removal from Tools	T1123	Audio Capture	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	T1124	System Time Discovery	T1547.010	Port Monitors
T1036.002	Right-to-Left Override	T1125	Video Capture	T1553.002	Code Signing
T1036.004	Masquerade Task or Service	T1134.004	Parent PID Spoofing	T1555.002	Securityd Memory
T1036.006	Space after Filename	T1137.006	Add-ins	T1560.002	Archive via Library
T1039	Data from Network Shared Drive	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Info.	T1560.003	Archive via Custom Method
T1049	System Network Conn. Discovery	T1202	Indirect Command Execution	T1564	Hide Artifacts
T1056	Input Capture	T1207	Rogue Domain Controller	T1564.001	Hidden Files and Directories
T1586.001	Social Media Accounts	T1217	Browser Bookmark Discovery	T1564.005	Hidden File System
T1586.002	Email Accounts	T1496	Resource Hijacking	T1568.001	Fast Flux DNS
T1056.001	Keylogging	T1497	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	T1568.003	DNS Calculation
T1056.004	Credential API Hooking	T1497.001	System Checks	T1578.004	Revert Cloud Instance
T1057	Process Discovery	T1497.002	User Activity Based Checks	T1600	Weaken Encryption
T1069	Permission Groups Discovery	T1497.003	Time Based Evasion	T1600.001	Reduce Key Space
T1069.001	Local Groups	T1505.003	Web Shell	T1600.002	Disable Crypto Hardware
T1069.002	Domain Groups	T1518	Software Discovery		

¹ MITRE ATT&CK <https://attack.mitre.org/>

APPENDIX F

Unmapped CIS Safeguards to ATT&CK Framework

The following CIS Safeguards had no mapping to an ATT&CK mitigation or (sub-)technique.

Control	Safeguard	Title	IG1	IG2	IG3
1	1.3	Utilize an Active Discovery Tool		✓	✓
1	1.5	Use a Passive Asset Discovery Tool			✓
3	3.5	Securely Dispose of Data	✓	✓	✓
3	3.7	Establish and Maintain a Data Classification Scheme		✓	✓
3	3.8	Document Data Flows		✓	✓
3	3.9	Encrypt Data on Removable Media		✓	✓
3	3.13	Deploy a Data Loss Prevention Solution			✓
3	3.14	Log Sensitive Data Access			✓
4	4.3	Configure Automatic Session Locking on Enterprise Assets	✓	✓	✓
4	4.11	Enforce Remote Wipe Capability on Portable End-User Devices		✓	✓
4	4.12	Separate Enterprise Workspaces on Mobile End-User Devices			✓
5	5.6	Centralize Account Management		✓	✓
6	6.6	Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Authentication and Authorization Systems		✓	✓
6	6.7	Centralize Access Control		✓	✓
8	8.4	Standardize Time Synchronization		✓	✓
8	8.6	Collect DNS Query Audit Logs		✓	✓
8	8.7	Collect URL Request Audit Logs		✓	✓
8	8.8	Collect Command-Line Audit Logs		✓	✓
8	8.12	Collect Service Provider Logs			✓
9	9.5	Implement DMARC		✓	✓
10	10.4	Configure Automatic Anti-Malware Scanning of Removable Media		✓	✓
10	10.6	Centrally Manage Anti-Malware Software		✓	✓
12	12.3	Securely Manage Network Infrastructure		✓	✓
12	12.4	Establish and Maintain Architecture Diagram(s)		✓	✓
13	13.1	Centralize Security Event Alerting		✓	✓
13	13.6	Collect Network Traffic Flow Logs		✓	✓
13	13.11	Tune Security Event Alerting Thresholds			✓
14	14.7	Train Workforce on How to Identify and Report if Their Enterprise Assets are Missing Security Updates	✓	✓	✓

Control	Safeguard	Title	IG1	IG2	IG3
14	14.8	Train Workforce on the Dangers of Connecting to and Transmitting Enterprise Data Over Insecure Networks	✓	✓	✓
15	15.1	Establish and Maintain an Inventory of Service Providers	✓	✓	✓
15	15.2	Establish and Maintain a Service Provider Management Policy		✓	✓
15	15.3	Classify Service Providers		✓	✓
15	15.4	Ensure Service Provider Contracts Include Security Requirements		✓	✓
15	15.5	Assess Service Providers			✓
15	15.6	Monitor Service Providers			✓
16	16.6	Establish and Maintain a Severity Rating System and Process for Application Vulnerabilities		✓	✓
16	16.7	Use Standard Hardening Configuration Templates for Application Infrastructure		✓	✓
16	16.10	Apply Secure Design Principles in Application Architectures		✓	✓
16	16.14	Conduct Threat Modeling			✓
17	17.1	Designate Personnel to Manage Incident Handling	✓	✓	✓
17	17.2	Establish and Maintain Contact Information for Reporting Security Incidents	✓	✓	✓
17	17.3	Establish and Maintain an Enterprise Process for Reporting Incidents	✓	✓	✓
17	17.4	Establish and Maintain an Incident Response Process		✓	✓
17	17.5	Assign Key Roles and Responsibilities		✓	✓
17	17.6	Define Mechanisms for Communicating During Incident Response		✓	✓
17	17.7	Conduct Routine Incident Response Exercises		✓	✓
17	17.8	Conduct Post-Incident Reviews		✓	✓
17	17.9	Establish and Maintain Security Incident Thresholds			✓
18	18.4	Validate Security Measures			✓

ATT&CK Navigator¹ Visualizations for Attack Patterns

A full listing of JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) files can be found on CIS WorkBench [here](#).

Malware

Domain: Enterprise ATT&CK v8

Platforms: Linux®, macOS®, Windows®, Office 365®, Azure® AD, IaaS, SaaS, PRE, Network

TA0043: Reconnaissance	TA0042: Resource Development	TA0001: Initial Access	TA0002: Execution	TA0003: Persistence	TA0004: Privilege Escalation	TA0005: Defense Evasion	TA0006: Credential Access	TA0007: Discovery	TA0008: Lateral Movement	TA0009: Collection	TA0011: Command and Control	TA0010: Exfiltration	TA0040: Impact
T1595: Active Scanning	T1583: Acquire Infrastructure	T1189: Drive-by Compromise	T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter	T1098: Account Manipulation	T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	T1110: Brute Force	T1087: Account Discovery	T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services	T1560: Archive Collected Data	T1071: Application Layer Protocol	T1020: Automated Exfiltration	T1531: Account Access Removal
T1592: Gather Victim Host Information	T1583.005: Botnet	T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application	T1059.002: AppleScript	T1197: BITS Jobs	T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	T1134: Access Token Manipulation	T1134: Access Token Manipulation	T1087.004: Cloud Account	T1534: Internal Spearphishing	T1560.003: Archive via Custom Method	T1071.004: DNS	T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	T1485: Data Destruction
T1592.004: Client Configurations	T1583.002: DNS Server	T1133: External Remote Services	T1059.007: JavaScript/JScript	T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	T1548.002: Bypass User Account Control	T1197: BITS Jobs	T1110.002: Password Cracking	T1087.002: Domain Account	T1563: Remote Service Session Hijacking	T1560.002: Archive via Library	T1071.002: File Transfer Protocols	T1048.002: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact
T1592.003: Firmware	T1583.001: Domains	T1200: Hardware Additions	T1059.008: Network Device CLI	T1037: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	T1548.004: Elevated Execution with Prompt	T1006: Direct Volume Access	T1110.001: Password Guessing	T1087.003: Email Account	T1010: Application Window Discovery	T1560.001: Archive via Utility	T1071.001: Mail Protocols	T1048.001: Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	T1565: Data Manipulation
T1592.002: Software	T1583.003: Virtual Private Server	T1566: Phishing	T1059.001: PowerShell	T1154: Browser Extensions	T1548.001: Setuid and Setgid	T1484: Domain Policy Modification	T110.003: Password Spraying	T1087.001: Local Account	T1217: Browser Bookmark Discovery	T1123: Audio Capture	T1071.003: Web Protocols	T1048.003: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol	T1491: Defacement
T1599: Gather Victim Identity Information	T1583.006: Web Services	T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment	T1059.006: Python	T1554: Compromise Client Software Binary	T1548.003: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1480: Execution Guardrails	T1555: Credentials from Password Stores	T1010: Application Window Discovery	T1217: Browser Bookmark Discovery	T1119: Automated Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1048.004: Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol	T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service
T1590: Gather Victim Network Information	T1566: Compromise Accounts	T1566.002: Spearphishing Link	T1059.004: Unix Shell	T1136: Create Account	T1548.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1222: File and Directory Permissions Modification	T1555.003: Credentials from Web Browsers	T1021: Remote Services	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1160: Data from Configuration Repository	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1048.005: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol	T1495: Firmware Corruption
T1590.002: DNS	T1566.001: Social Media Accounts	T1566.003: Spearphishing via Service	T1059.005: Visual Basic Command Shell	T1136.003: Cloud Account	T1134: Access Token Manipulation	T1222.002: Linux and Mac File and Dir. Permissions Modification	T1555.001: Keychain	T1021.003: Distributed Component Object Model	T1160: Data from Configuration Repository	T1132: Data Encoding	T1132: Data Encoding	T1048.006: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol	T1498: Inhibit System Recovery
T1590.001: Domain Properties	T1584: Compromise Infrastructure	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1059.003: Windows Command Shell	T1136.002: Domain Account	T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	T1564: Hide Artifacts	T1555.002: Securityd Memory	T1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin Shares	T1048: Domain Trust Discovery	T1132.002: Non-Standard Encoding	T1001: Data Obfuscation	T1048.007: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	T1498: Network Denial of Service
T1590.005: IP Addresses	T1584.005: Botnet	T1195: Supply Chain Compromise	T1059.000: Windows Command Shell	T1136.001: Local Account	T1547.002: Authentication Package	T1564.005: Hidden File System	T1212: Exploitation for Credential Access	T1039: Data from Local System Shared Drive	T1046: Network Service Scanning	T1039: Data from Network Shared Drive	T1011: Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	T1048.008: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	T1489: Resource Hijacking
T1590.006: Network Security Appliances	T1584.002: DNS Server	T1199: Trusted Relationship	T1059.002: Dynamic Data Exchange	T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1547.003: Kernel Modules and Extensions	T1564.001: Hidden Files and Directories	T1083: File and Directory Discovery	T1025: Data from Removable Media	T1099: Replication Through Removable Media	T1025: Data from Removable Media	T1011: Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	T1048.009: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	T1529: System Shutdown/Reboot
T1590.004: Network Topology	T1584.001: Domains	T1078: Valid Accounts	T1559.001: Component Object Model	T1546: Event Triggered Execution	T1547.004: LSASS Driver	T1564.002: Hidden Users	T1056: Input Capture	T1074: Data Staged	T1201: Password Policy Discovery	T1074: Data Staged	T1011: Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	T1048.010: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	
T1590.003: Network Trust Dependencies	T1584.003: Virtual Private Server		T1559.002: Systemd Timers	T1546.004: .bash_profile and .bashrc	T1547.005: Print Processors	T1564.003: Hidden Window	T1056.002: GUI Input Capture	T1074.002: Remote Data Staging	T1021.005: VNC	T1074.002: Remote Data Staging	T1573: Encrypted Channel	T1048.011: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	
T1591: Gather Victim Org Information	T1584.006: Web Services		T1106: Native API	T1546.005: Security Support Provider	T1547.007: Re-opened Applications	T1564.004: NTFS File Attributes	T1056.003: Web Portal Capture	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1021.006: Windows Remote Management	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1573.002: Asymmetric Cryptography	T1048.012: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage	
T1598: Phishing for Information	T1587: Develop Capabilities		T1053: Scheduled Task/Job	T1546.001: Change Default File Association	T1547.008: Path Interception	T1564.006: Run Virtual Instance	T1557: Man-in-the-Middle	T1069: Permission Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1573.001: Symmetric Cryptography	T1048.013: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
T1597: Search Closed Sources	T1587.002: Code Signing Certificates		T1053.001: At (Linux)	T1546.015: Component Object Model Hijacking	T1547.009: Shortcut Modification	T1564.007: VBA Stomping	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.003: Cloud Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.002: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage	T1048.014: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
T1596: Search Open Technical Databases	T1587.001: Malware		T1053.002: At (Windows)	T1546.016: Execution Options Injection	T1547.003: Time Providers	T1564.008: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.015: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
T1593: Search Open Websites/Domains	T1585: Establish Accounts		T1053.003: Cron	T1546.017: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL	T1564.009: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.016: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
T1594: Search Victim-Owned Websites	T1585.001: Obtain Capabilities		T1053.004: Launchd	T1546.018: LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	T1547.007: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	T1564.010: Services File Permissions Weakness	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.017: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
	T1585.002: Code Signing Certificates		T1053.005: Scheduled Task	T1546.019: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1547.008: Path Interception by Path Environment Variable	T1564.011: Services Registry Permissions Weakness	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.018: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
	T1588.004: Digital Certificates		T1053.006: Systemd Timers	T1546.020: .bash_profile and .bashrc	T1564.012: COR_PROFILER	T1564.012: COR_PROFILER	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.019: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
	T1588.005: Exploits		T1129: Shared Modules	T1546.021: Application Shim	T1547.010: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking	T1564.013: Services Registry Permissions Weakness	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.003: Cloud Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.020: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
	T1588.001: Malware		T1072: Software Deployment Tools	T1546.022: Application Shim	T1564.014: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.014: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.021: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
	T1588.002: Tool		T1569: System Services	T1546.023: Application Shim	T1564.015: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.015: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.022: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
	T1588.006: Vulnerabilities		T1072: Software Deployment Tools	T1546.024: Application Shim	T1564.016: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.016: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.023: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1569: System Services	T1546.025: Application Shim	T1564.017: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.017: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.003: Cloud Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.024: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1569.001: Launchctl	T1546.026: Application Shim	T1564.018: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.018: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.025: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1569.002: Service Execution	T1546.027: Application Shim	T1564.019: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.019: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.026: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1204: User Execution	T1546.028: Application Shim	T1564.020: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.020: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.027: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1204.002: Malicious File	T1546.029: Application Shim	T1564.021: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.021: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.003: Cloud Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.028: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1204.001: Malicious Link	T1546.030: Application Shim	T1564.022: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.022: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.029: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1546.031: Application Shim	T1564.023: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.023: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.030: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.032: Application Shim	T1564.024: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.024: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.003: Cloud Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.031: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.033: Application Shim	T1564.025: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.025: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.032: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.034: Application Shim	T1564.026: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.026: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.033: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.035: Application Shim	T1564.027: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.027: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.003: Cloud Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.034: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.036: Application Shim	T1564.028: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.028: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.035: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.037: Application Shim	T1564.029: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.029: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.036: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.038: Application Shim	T1564.030: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.030: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.003: Cloud Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.037: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.039: Application Shim	T1564.031: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.031: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.038: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.040: Application Shim	T1564.032: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.032: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.039: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.041: Application Shim	T1564.033: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.033: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.003: Cloud Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.040: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.042: Application Shim	T1564.034: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.034: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.041: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.043: Application Shim	T1564.035: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.035: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.042: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.044: Application Shim	T1564.036: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.036: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.003: Cloud Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.043: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.045: Application Shim	T1564.037: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.037: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.044: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.046: Application Shim	T1564.038: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.038: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.045: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.047: Application Shim	T1564.039: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.039: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.003: Cloud Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1048.046: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
				T1546.048: Application Shim	T1564.040: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1564.040: Image File Execution Options Injection	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1567.000: Exfiltration to Code Repository		

Ransomware

Domain: Enterprise ATT&CK v8

Platforms: Linux®, macOS®, Windows®, Office 365®, Azure® AD, IaaS, SaaS, PRE, Network

TA0043: Reconnaissance	TA0042: Resource Development	TA0001: Initial Access	TA0002: Execution	TA0003: Persistence	TA0004: Privilege Escalation	TA0005: Defense Evasion	TA0006: Credential Access	TA0007: Discovery	TA0008: Lateral Movement	TA0009: Collection	TA0011: Command and Control	TA0010: Exfiltration	TA0040: Impact
T1595: Active Scanning	T1583: Acquire Infrastructure	T1189: Drive-by Compromise	T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter	T1098: Account Manipulation	T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	T1110: Brute Force	T1087: Account Discovery	T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services	T1560: Archive Collected Data	T1071: Application Layer Protocol	T1020: Automated Exfiltration	T1531: Account Access Removal
T1592: Gather Victim Host Information	T1583.005: Botnet	T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application	T1059.002: AppleScript	T1197: BITS Jobs	T1548.002: Bypass User Account Control	T1134: Access Token Manipulation	T1110.004: Credential Stuffing	T1010: Application Window Discovery	T1534: Internal Spearphishing	T1560.003: Archive via Custom Method	T1071.004: DNS	T1030: Data Transfer Size Limits	T1485: Data Destruction
T1592.004: Client Configurations	T1583.002: DNS Server	T1133: External Remote Services	T1059.007: JavaScript/JScript	T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	T1548.004: Elevated Execution with Prompt	T1134.003: Create Process with Token	T1110.002: Password Cracking	T1217: Browser Bookmark Discovery	T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer	T1560.002: Archive via Library	T1071.002: File Transfer Protocols	T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact
T1592.003: Firmware	T1583.001: Domains	T1200: Hardware Additions	T1059.008: Network Device CLI	T1037: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	T1548.003: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.004: Parent PID Spoofing	T1110.001: Password Guessing	T1538: Cloud Service Dashboard	T1563: Remote Service Session Hijacking	T1560.001: Archive via Utility	T1071.001: Web Protocols	T1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	T1565: Data Manipulation
T1592.002: Software	T1583.004: Server	T1566: Phishing	T1059.001: PowerShell	T1037.002: Logon Script (Mac)	T1134.005: SID-History Injection	T1134.001: Token Impersonation/Theft	T1110.003: Password Spraying	T1526: Cloud Service Discovery	T1563.002: RDP Hijacking	T1123: Audio Capture	T1071.003: Mail Protocols	T1041: Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	T1491: Defacement
T1589: Gather Victim Identity Information	T1583.006: Web Services	T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment	T1059.006: Python	T1037.001: Logon Script (Windows)	T1134.002: Make and Impersonate Token	T1197: BITS Jobs	T1555: Credentials from Password Stores	T1482: Domain Trust Discovery	T1563.001: SSH Hijacking	T1119: Automated Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1011: Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	T1561: Disk Wipe
T1589.001: Credentials	T1586: Compromise Accounts	T1566.002: Spearphishing Link	T1059.004: Unix Shell	T1037.003: Network Logon Script	T1134.004: Parent PID Spoofing	T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	T1555.003: Credentials from Web Browsers	T1083: File and Directory Discovery	T1021: Remote Services	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1132: Data Encoding	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1495: Firmware Corruption
T1589.002: Email Addresses	T1584: Compromise Infrastructure	T1566.003: Spearphishing via Service	T1059.003: Visual Basic Command Shell	T1037.004: Rc.common	T1134.005: SID-History Injection	T1484: Domain Policy Modification	T1555.001: Keychain	T1046: Network Service Discovery	T1021.001: Remote Desktop Protocol	T1602: Data from Configuration Repository	T1132.002: Non-Standard Encoding	T1567: Exfiltration Over Web Service	T1490: Inhibit System Recovery
T1589.003: Employee Names	T1587: Develop Capabilities	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1059.002: Windows Command Shell	T1037.005: Startup Items	T1134.001: Token Impersonation/Theft	T1484.001: Group Policy Modification	T1555.002: Securityd Memory	T1046: Network Service Discovery	T1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin Shares	T1213: Data from Information Repositories	T1132.001: Standard Encoding	T1567.002: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage	T1498: Network Denial of Service
T1590: Gather Victim Network Information	T1587.002: Code Signing Certificates	T1195: Supply Chain Compromise	T1203: Exploitation for Client Execution	T1176: Browser Extensions	T1547.002: Authentication Package	T1480: Execution Guardrails	T1212: Exploitation for Credential Access	T1040: Network Sniffing	T1021.004: SSH	T1005: Data from Local System Shared Drive	T1132.002: Non-Standard Encoding	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1499: Resource Hijacking
T1591: Gather Victim Org Information	T1587.003: Digital Certificates	T1195: Supply Chain Compromise	T1106: Native API	T1554: Compromise Client Software Binary	T1547.003: Time Providers	T1222: File and Directory Permissions Modification	T1187: Forced Authentication	T1201: Password Policy Discovery	T1021.005: VNC	T1021.006: Windows Remote Management	T1001.001: Junk Data	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1489: Service Stop
T1598: Phishing for Information	T1587.004: Exploits	T1078: Valid Accounts	T1053: Scheduled Task/Job	T1554: Compromise Client Software Binary	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL	T1564: Hide Artifacts	T1606: Forge Web Credentials	T1120: Peripheral Device Discovery	T1021.006: Windows Remote Management	T1025: Data from Removable Media	T1001.002: Steganography	T1029: Scheduled Transfer	T1529: System Shutdown/Reboot
T1598.002: Spearphishing Attachment	T1587.001: Malware	T1195.003: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain	T1129: Shared Modules	T1547.001: Print Processors	T1543.001: Launch Agent	T1564.005: Hidden File System	T1056: Input Capture	T1069: Permission Groups Discovery	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1074: Data Staged	T1568: Dynamic Resolution		
T1598.003: Spearphishing Link	T1588: Obtain Capabilities	T1195.001: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools	T1072: Software Deployment Tools	T1547.007: Re-opened Applications	T1543.002: Create or Modify System Process	T1564.001: Hidden Files and Directories	T1056.004: Credential API Hooking	T1069: Permission Groups Discovery	T1072: Software Deployment Tools	T1114: Email Collection	T1573: Encrypted Channel		
T1598.001: Spearphishing Service	T1588.003: Code Signing Certificates	T1195.002: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools	T1569: System Services	T1547.005: Security Support Provider	T1546: Event Triggered Execution	T1564.002: Hidden Window	T1056.002: GUI Input Capture	T1069.003: Cloud Groups	T1072: Software Deployment Tools	T1114.003: Email Forwarding Rule	T1573.002: Asymmetric Cryptography		
T1597: Search Closed Sources	T1588.004: Digital Certificates	T1195.002: Compromise Software Supply Chain	T1133: External Remote Services	T1547.006: Run Virtual Instance	T1107: Hijack Execution Flow	T1564.003: NTFIS File Attributes	T1056.001: Keylogging	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1072: Software Deployment Tools	T1114.001: Local Email Collection	T1573.001: Symmetric Cryptography		
T1596: Search Open Technical Databases	T1588.001: Malware	T1195.002: Compromise Software Supply Chain	T1204: User Execution	T1547.003: Time Providers	T1574: Hijack Execution Flow	T1564.006: Run Virtual Instance	T1056.003: Web Portal Capture	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1124: System Time Discovery	T1114.002: Remote Email Collection		
T1593: Search Open Websites/Domains	T1588.002: Malware	T1078: Valid Accounts	T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL	T1543.003: Create or Modify System Process	T1574.007: VBA Stomping	T1557: Man-in-the-Middle	T1057: Process Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1025: Data from Removable Media	T1108: Multi-Stage Channels		
T1594: Search Victim-Owned Websites	T1588.006: Vulnerabilities	T1078.004: Cloud Accounts		T1543.004: Launch Daemon	T1543.001: Launch Agent	T1574.001: DLL Search Order Hijacking	T1557.002: ARP Cache Poisoning	T1012: Query Registry	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1104: Multi-Stage Channels		
		T1078.001: Default Accounts		T1543.002: Systemd Service	T1543.004: Launch Daemon	T1574.002: DLL Side-Loading	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
		T1078.002: Domain Accounts		T1543.003: Windows Service	T1543.004: Launch Daemon	T1574.003: Dylib Hijacking	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
		T1078.003: Local Accounts		T1543.004: Windows Service	T1543.005: Windows Service	T1574.004: Dylib Hijacking	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.005: Windows Service	T1543.006: Windows Service	T1574.005: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.006: Windows Service	T1543.007: Re-opened Applications	T1574.006: LD_PRELOAD	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.007: Re-opened Applications	T1543.008: Windows Service	T1574.007: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.008: Windows Service	T1543.009: Windows Service	T1574.008: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.009: Windows Service	T1543.010: Windows Service	T1574.009: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.010: Windows Service	T1543.011: Windows Service	T1574.010: Services File Permissions Weakness	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.011: Windows Service	T1543.012: Windows Service	T1574.011: Services Registry Permissions Weakness	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.012: Windows Service	T1543.013: Windows Service	T1574.012: COR_PROFILER	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.013: Windows Service	T1543.014: Windows Service	T1574.013: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.014: Windows Service	T1543.015: Windows Service	T1574.014: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.015: Windows Service	T1543.016: Windows Service	T1574.015: Services File Permissions Weakness	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.016: Windows Service	T1543.017: Windows Service	T1574.016: Services Registry Permissions Weakness	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.017: Windows Service	T1543.018: Windows Service	T1574.017: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.018: Windows Service	T1543.019: Windows Service	T1574.018: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.019: Windows Service	T1543.020: Windows Service	T1574.019: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.020: Windows Service	T1543.021: Windows Service	T1574.020: Services File Permissions Weakness	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.021: Windows Service	T1543.022: Windows Service	T1574.021: Services Registry Permissions Weakness	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.022: Windows Service	T1543.023: Windows Service	T1574.022: COR_PROFILER	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.023: Windows Service	T1543.024: Windows Service	T1574.023: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.024: Windows Service	T1543.025: Windows Service	T1574.024: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.025: Windows Service	T1543.026: Windows Service	T1574.025: Services File Permissions Weakness	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.026: Windows Service	T1543.027: Windows Service	T1574.026: Services Registry Permissions Weakness	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.027: Windows Service	T1543.028: Windows Service	T1574.027: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.028: Windows Service	T1543.029: Windows Service	T1574.028: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.029: Windows Service	T1543.030: Windows Service	T1574.029: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.030: Windows Service	T1543.031: Windows Service	T1574.030: Services File Permissions Weakness	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.031: Windows Service	T1543.032: Windows Service	T1574.031: Services Registry Permissions Weakness	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.032: Windows Service	T1543.033: Windows Service	T1574.032: COR_PROFILER	T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol		
				T1543.033: Windows Service	T1543.								

Web Application Hacking

Domain: Enterprise ATT&CK v8

Platforms: Linux®, macOS®, Windows®, Office 365®, Azure® AD, IaaS, SaaS, PRE, Network

TA0043: Reconnaissance	TA0042: Resource Development	TA0001: Initial Access	TA0002: Execution	TA0003: Persistence	TA0004: Privilege Escalation	TA0005: Defense Evasion	TA0006: Credential Access	TA0006: Credential Access	TA0008: Lateral Movement	TA0009: Collection	TA0011: Command and Control	TA0010: Exfiltration	TA0040: Impact
T1595: Active Scanning	T1583: Acquire Infrastructure	T1189: Drive-by Compromise	T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter	T1098: Account Manipulation	T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	T1110: Brute Force	T1110: Brute Force	T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services	T1560: Archive Collected Data	T1071: Application Layer Protocol	T1020: Automated Exfiltration	T1531: Account Access Removal
T1595.001: Scanning IP Blocks	T1583.005: Botnet	T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application	T1059.002: AppleScript	T1197: BITS Jobs	T1548.002: Bypass User Account Control	T1134: Access Token Manipulation	T1110.004: Credential Stuffing	T1110.004: Credential Stuffing	T1210.003: Distributed Services	T1123: Audio Capture	T1071.004: DNS	T1030: Data Transfer Size Limits	T1485: Data Destruction
T1595.002: Vulnerability Scanning	T1583.002: DNS Server	T1133: External Remote Services	T1059.007: JavaScript/JScript	T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	T1548.004: Elevated Execution with Prompt	T1197: BITS Jobs	T1110.002: Password Cracking	T1110.002: Password Cracking	T1534: Internal Spearphishing	T1119: Automated Collection	T1071.002: File Transfer Protocols	T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact
T1592: Gather Victim Host Information	T1583.001: Domains	T1200: Hardware Additions	T1059.008: Network Device CLI	T1037: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	T1548.003: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1006: Direct Volume Access	T1110.001: Password Guessing	T1110.001: Password Guessing	T1563: Remote Service Session Hijacking	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1071.003: Mail Protocols	T1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	T1565: Data Manipulation
T1589: Gather Victim Identity Information	T1583.004: Server	T1566: Phishing	T1059.001: PowerShell	T1037: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	T1134.002: Create Process with Token	T1484: Domain Policy Modification	T1110.003: Password Spraying	T1110.003: Password Spraying	T1021: Remote Services Hijacking	T1530: Data from Cloud Storage Object	T1071.001: Web Protocols	T1011: Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	T1491: Defacement
T1590: Gather Victim Network Information	T1583.006: Web Services	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1059.006: Python	T1037.001: Logon Script (Windows)	T1134.003: Make and Impersonate Token	T1480: Execution Guardrails	T1555: Credentials from Password Stores	T1555: Credentials from Password Stores	T1021.002: Distributed Component Object Model Protocol	T1602: Data from Configuration Repository	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service
T1591: Gather Victim Org Information	T1584: Compromise Accounts	T1195: Supply Chain Compromise	T1059.004: Unix Shell	T1037.002: Logon Script (Windows)	T1134.004: Parent PID Spoofing	T1222: File and Directory Permissions Modification	T1555.003: Credentials from Web Browsers	T1555.003: Credentials from Web Browsers	T1021.001: Remote Desktop Protocol	T1213: Data from Information Repositories	T1093: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.003: Application Exhaustion Flood
T1598: Phishing for Information	T1584.005: Botnet	T1199: Trusted Relationship	T1059.005: Visual Basic	T1037.003: Network Logon Script	T1134.005: SID-History Injection	T1564: Hide Artifacts	T1555.001: Keychain	T1555.001: Keychain	T1005: Data from Local System Shared Drive	T1100: Data Obfuscation	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.004: Application or System Exploitation
T1597: Search Closed Sources	T1584.002: DNS Server	T1078: Valid Accounts	T1059.003: Windows Command Shell	T1037.004: Rc.common	T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	T1574: Hijack Execution Flow	T1555.002: Securityd Memory	T1555.002: Securityd Memory	T1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin Shares	T1039: Data from Network Shared Drive	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.005: OS Exhaustion Flood
T1596: Search Open Technical Databases	T1584.001: Domains	T1078.004: Cloud Accounts	T1059.002: Dynamic Data Exchange	T1037.005: Startup Items	T1547.002: Authentication Package	T1574.012: COR_PROFILER	T1212: Exploitation for Credential Access	T1212: Exploitation for Credential Access	T1021.004: SSH	T1008: fallback Channels	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.006: OS Exhaustion Flood
T1596.004: CDNs	T1584.004: Server	T1078.001: Default Accounts	T1559.001: Component Object Model	T1176: Browser Extensions	T1547.006: Kernel Modules and Extensions	T1574.011: DLL Side-Loading	T1606: Forge Web Credentials	T1606: Forge Web Credentials	T1021.005: VNC	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.007: OS Exhaustion Flood
T1596.003: Digital Certificates	T1584.006: Web Services	T1078.002: Domain Accounts	T1559.002: Dynamic Data Exchange	T1136: Create Account	T1547.008: LSASS Driver	T1574.004: DYLIB Hijacking	T1606.002: SAML Tokens	T1606.002: SAML Tokens	T1021.006: Windows Remote Management	T1104: Data Staged	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.008: OS Exhaustion Flood
T1596.001: DNS/Passive DNS	T1587: Develop Capabilities	T1078.003: Local Accounts	T1106: Native API	T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1547.012: Print Processors	T1574.005: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness	T1606.001: Web Cookies	T1606.001: Web Cookies	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.009: OS Exhaustion Flood
T1596.005: Scan Databases	T1588: Obtain Capabilities		T1053: Scheduled Task/Job Execution	T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1547.007: Re-opened Applications	T1574.002: DLL Side-Loading	T1056: Input Capture	T1056: Input Capture	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.010: OS Exhaustion Flood
T1596.002: WHOIS			T1129: Shared Modules	T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	T1574.003: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable	T1056.004: Credential API Hooking	T1056.004: Credential API Hooking	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.011: OS Exhaustion Flood
T1593: Search Open Websites/Domains			T1072: Software Deployment Tools	T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1547.009: Security Support Provider	T1574.008: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking	T1056.002: GUI Input Capture	T1056.002: GUI Input Capture	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.012: OS Exhaustion Flood
T1594: Search Victim-Owned Websites			T1569: System Services	T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1547.009: Shortcut Modification	T1574.009: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1056.001: Keylogging	T1056.001: Keylogging	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.013: OS Exhaustion Flood
			T1569.001: Launchctl	T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1547.003: Time Providers	T1574.010: Services File Permissions Weakness	T1056.003: Web Portal Capture	T1056.003: Web Portal Capture	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.014: OS Exhaustion Flood
			T1569.002: Service Execution	T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL	T1574.011: Services Registry Permissions Weakness	T1557: Man-in-the-Middle	T1557: Man-in-the-Middle	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.015: OS Exhaustion Flood
			T1204: User Execution	T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1543.001: Launch Agent	T1574.012: DLL Side-Loading	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.016: OS Exhaustion Flood
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1543.004: Launch Daemon	T1574.004: DYLIB Hijacking	T1040: Network Sniffing	T1040: Network Sniffing	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.017: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1543.002: Systemd Service	T1574.005: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness	T1003: OS Credential Dumping	T1003: OS Credential Dumping	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.018: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1543.003: Windows Service	T1574.006: Kernel Modules and Extensions	T1528: Steal Application Access Token	T1528: Steal Application Access Token	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.019: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036: Masquerading	T1574.007: Re-opened Applications	T1558: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets	T1558: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.020: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.001: Invalid Code Signature	T1574.008: LSASS Driver	T1558.004: AS-REP Roasting	T1558.004: AS-REP Roasting	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.021: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.004: Masquerade Task or Service	T1547.011: Plist Modification	T1558.001: Golden Ticket	T1558.001: Golden Ticket	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.022: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.005: Match Legitimate Name or Location	T1547.012: Print Processors	T1558.003: Kerberoasting	T1558.003: Kerberoasting	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.023: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.003: Rename System Utilities	T1547.007: Re-opened Applications	T1558.002: Silver Ticket	T1558.002: Silver Ticket	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.024: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.002: Right-to-Left Override	T1547.009: Security Support Provider	T1559: Steal Web Session Cookie	T1559: Steal Web Session Cookie	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.025: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.003: Time Providers	T1111: Two-Factor Authentication Interception	T1111: Two-Factor Authentication Interception	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.026: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL	T1552: Unsecured Credentials	T1552: Unsecured Credentials	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.027: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL	T1552.003: Bash History	T1552.003: Bash History	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.028: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL	T1552.005: Cloud Instance Metadata API	T1552.005: Cloud Instance Metadata API	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.029: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL	T1552.001: Credentials In Files	T1552.001: Credentials In Files	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.030: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL	T1552.002: Credentials in Registry	T1552.002: Credentials in Registry	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.031: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL	T1552.006: Group Policy Preferences	T1552.006: Group Policy Preferences	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.032: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL	T1552.004: Private Keys	T1552.004: Private Keys	T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.033: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.034: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.035: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.036: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.037: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.038: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.039: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.040: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.041: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.042: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.043: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.044: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.045: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.046: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.047: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.048: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.049: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.050: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.051: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.052: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.053: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.054: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged	T1114: Email Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499.055: OS Exhaustion Flood
				T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1547.004: Winlogon Helper DLL			T1074: Data Staged				

Insider Privilege and Misuse

Domain: Enterprise ATT&CK v8

Platforms: Linux®, macOS®, Windows®, Office 365®, Azure® AD, AWS®, GCP®, Azure®, SaaS, PRE, Network

TA0043: Reconnaissance	TA0042: Resource Development	TA0001: Initial Access	TA0002: Execution	TA0003: Persistence	TA0004: Privilege Escalation	TA0005: Defense Evasion	TA0006: Credential Access	TA0007: Discovery	TA0008: Lateral Movement	TA0009: Collection	TA0011: Command and Control	TA0010: Exfiltration	TA0040: Impact
T1595: Active Scanning	T1583: Acquire Infrastructure	T1189: Drive-by Compromise	T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter	T1098: Account Manipulation	T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	T1154: Access Token Manipulation	T1110: Brute Force	T1087: Account Discovery	T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services	T1560: Archive Collected Data	T1071: Application Layer Protocol	T1020: Automated Exfiltration	T1531: Account Access Removal
T1592: Gather Victim Host Information	T1586: Compromise Accounts	T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application	T1059.002: AppleScript	T1197: BITS Jobs	T1134: Access Token	T1197: BITS Jobs	T1110.004: Credential Stuffing	T1087.004: Cloud Account	T1534: Internal Spearphishing	T1560.003: Archive via Custom Method	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	T1485: Data Destruction
T1592.004: Client Configurations	T1587: Develop Capabilities Infrastructure	T1133: External Remote Services	T1059.007: JavaScript/JScript	T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	T1134: Access Token Manipulation	T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	T1110.002: Password Cracking	T1087.002: Domain Account	T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer	T1560.002: Archive via Library	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact
T1592.003: Firmware	T1587.002: Code Signing	T1200: Hardware Additions	T1059.008: Network Device CLI	T1037: Boot or Logon Execution	T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	T1006: Direct Volume Access	T1110.001: Password Guessing	T1087.003: Email Account	T1563: Remote Service Session Hijacking	T1560.001: Archive via Utility	T1132: Data Encoding	T1011: Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	T1565: Data Manipulation
T1592.002: Software	T1587.003: Digital Certificates	T1566: Phishing	T1059.001: PowerShell	T1176: Browser Extensions	T1037: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	T1484: Domain Policy Modification	T1110.003: Password Spraying	T1087.000: Local Account	T1021: Remote Services	T1123: Audio Capture	T1001: Data Obfuscation	T1011.001: Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	T1565.003: Runtime Data Manipulation
T1589: Gather Victim Identity Information	T1587.004: Exploits	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1059.000: Python	T1136: Create Account	T1544: Create or Modify System Process	T1480: Execution Guardrails	T1555: Credentials from Password Stores	T1010: Application Window Discovery	T1217: Browser Bookmark Discovery	T1119: Automated Collection	T1573: Encrypted Channel	T1011.002: Exfiltration Over HTTP	T1565.002: Transmitted Data Manipulation
T1589.001: Credentials	T1587.000: Malware	T1195: Supply Chain Compromise	T1059.003: Windows Command Shell	T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1211: Exploitation for Defense Evasion	T1555.001: Keychain	T1580: Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	T1021.003: Distributed Component Object Model Protocol	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1508: Failback Channels	T1011.003: Exfiltration Over Web Services	T1565.001: Stored Data Manipulation
T1589.002: Email Addresses	T1589: Obtain Capabilities	T1195.003: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain	T1059.005: Visual Basic	T1543.002: Systemd Service	T1543: Create or Modify System Process	T1222: File and Directory Permissions Modification	T1555.002: Securityd Memory	T1538: Cloud Service Dashboard	T1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin Shares	T1530: Data from Cloud Storage Object	T1108: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1491: Defacement
T1589.003: Employee Names	T1588.003: Code Signing	T1195.001: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools	T1059.004: Unix Shell	T1546: Event Triggered Execution	T1543.003: Windows Service	T1564.005: Hidden File System	T1564.001: Hidden Files and Directories	T1526: Cloud Service Discovery	T1021.004: SSH	T1602: Data from Configuration Repository	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer	T1052.001: Exfiltration over USB	T1561.001: Disk Content Wipe
T1590: Gather Victim Network Information	T1588.004: Digital Certificates	T1195.002: Compromise Software Supply Chain	T1059.000: Windows Command Shell	T1133: External Remote Services	T1484: Domain Policy Modification	T1564.001: Hidden Files and Directories	T1564.002: Hidden Users	T1482: Domain Trust Discovery	T1021.005: VNC	T1213: Data from Information Repositories	T1104: Multi-Stage Channels	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage	T1561.002: Disk Structure Wipe
T1591: Gather Victim Org Information	T1588.005: Exploits	T1199: Trusted Relationship	T1059.000: Windows Command Shell	T1546: Event Triggered Execution	T1546: Event Triggered Execution	T1564.004: NTFS File Attributes	T1564.003: Hidden Window	T1083: File and Directory Discovery	T1021.006: Windows Remote Management	T1213.002: Sharepoint	T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol	T1567.002: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage	T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service
T1591.002: Business Relationships	T1588.001: Malware	T1072: Software Deployment Tools	T1059.000: Windows Command Shell	T1137: Office Application Startup	T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	T1564.006: Run Virtual Instance	T1564.004: NTFS File Attributes	T1056: Input Capture	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1005: Data from Local System Shared Drive	T1572: Protocol Tunneling	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1496: Network Denial of Service
T1591.001: Determine Physical Locations	T1588.002: Tool	T1078: Valid Accounts	T1059.000: Windows Command Shell	T1547: Hijack Execution Flow	T1547: Hijack Execution Flow	T1564.007: VBA Stomping	T1564.000: Hidden Users	T1004: Credential API Hooking	T1080: Taint Shared Content	T1219: Remote Access Software	T1205: Traffic Signaling	T1567.002: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1490: Network Denial of Service
T1591.003: Identify Business Tempo	T1588.006: Vulnerabilities	T1078.004: Cloud Accounts	T1059.000: Windows Command Shell	T1542: Pre-OS Boot	T1562: Impair Defenses	T1574: Hijack Execution Flow	T1562.008: Disable Cloud Logs	T1056.002: GUI Input Capture	T1550: Use Alternate Authentication Material	T1072: Software Deployment Tools	T1102: Web Service	T1567.003: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1499: Resource Hijacking
T1591.004: Identify Roles		T1078.001: Default Accounts	T1059.000: Windows Command Shell	T1053: Scheduled Task/Job	T1562.008: Disable Cloud Logs	T1574.012: COR_PROFILER Hijacking	T1562.007: Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall	T1056.003: Web Portal Capture	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1072: Software Deployment Tools	T1074: Data Staged	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1496: Network Denial of Service
T1598: Phishing for Information		T1078.002: Domain Accounts	T1059.000: Windows Command Shell	T1505: Server Software Component	T1562.004: Disable or Modify System Firewall	T1574.001: DLL Search Order Hijacking	T1562.004: Disable or Modify System Firewall	T1056.001: Keylogging	T1072: Software Deployment Tools	T1074.001: Local Data Staging	T1074.002: Remote Data Staging	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1495: Firmware Corruption
T1597: Search Closed Sources		T1078.003: Local Accounts	T1059.000: Windows Command Shell	T1205: Traffic Signaling	T1562.001: Disable or Modify Tools	T1574.002: DLL Side-Loading	T1562.002: Disable Windows Event Logging	T1557: Man-in-the-Middle	T1072: Software Deployment Tools	T1074.002: Remote Data Staging	T1114: Email Collection	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1490: Network Denial of Service
T1596: Search Open Technical Databases			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell	T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1562.000: Disable Windows Event Logging	T1574.004: Dll Hijacking	T1562.003: Disable Windows Event Logging	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069: Permission Groups	T1114.003: Email Forwarding Rule	T1114.001: Local Email Collection	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1489: Service Stop
T1593: Search Open Websites/Domains			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1562.000: Indicator Blocking	T1574.005: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness	T1562.006: Indicator Blocking	T1040: Network Sniffing	T1069: Permission Groups	T1114.003: Email Forwarding Rule	T1114.002: Remote Email Collection	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	T1529: System Shutdown/Reboot
T1594: Search Victim-Owned Websites			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1070: Indicator Removal on Host	T1574.006: LD_PRELOAD	T1070.003: Clear Command History	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.003: Cloud Groups	T1057: Process Discovery	T1114.001: Local Email Collection	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1070.002: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs	T1574.007: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable	T1070.002: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1012: Query Registry	T1114.002: Remote Email Collection	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1070.001: Clear Windows Event Logs	T1574.008: Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking	T1070.001: Clear Windows Event Logs	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1018: Remote System Discovery	T1056: Input Capture	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1070.004: File Deletion	T1574.009: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1070.004: File Deletion	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups	T1518: Software Discovery	T1056: Input Capture	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1070.005: Network Share Connection Removal	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1070.005: Network Share Connection Removal	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups	T1518.001: Security Software Discovery	T1185: Man in the Browser	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1070.006: Timestamp	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1070.006: Timestamp	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups	T1518.001: Security Software Discovery	T1557: Man-in-the-Middle	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1574.010: Services File Permissions Weakness	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1574.010: Services File Permissions Weakness	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups	T1082: System Information Discovery	T1113: Screen Capture	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1036.001: Invalid Code Signature	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1036.001: Invalid Code Signature	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups	T1082: System Information Discovery	T1125: Video Capture	T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1036.004: Masquerade Task or Service	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1036.004: Masquerade Task or Service	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups	T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery		T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1036.005: Match Legitimate Name or Location	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1036.005: Match Legitimate Name or Location	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups	T1049: System Network Connections Discovery		T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1036.003: Rename System Utilities	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1036.003: Rename System Utilities	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups	T1033: System Owner/User Discovery		T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1036.002: Right-to-Left Override	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1036.002: Right-to-Left Override	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups	T1007: System Service Discovery		T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1036.006: Space after Filename	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups	T1124: System Time Discovery		T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups	T1497: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion		T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1578: Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1578: Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1578.002: Create Cloud Instance	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1578.002: Create Cloud Instance	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1578.001: Create Snapshot	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1578.001: Create Snapshot	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1578.003: Delete Cloud Instance	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1578.003: Delete Cloud Instance	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1578.004: Revert Cloud Instance	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1578.004: Revert Cloud Instance	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1112: Modify Registry	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1112: Modify Registry	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1601: Modify System Image	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1601: Modify System Image	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1599: Network Boundary Bridging	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1599: Network Boundary Bridging	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1542: Pre-OS Boot	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1542: Pre-OS Boot	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1055: Process Injection	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1055: Process Injection	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1207: Rogue Domain Controller	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1207: Rogue Domain Controller	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1014: Rootkit	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1014: Rootkit	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1218: Signed Binary Proxy Execution	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1218: Signed Binary Proxy Execution	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1216: Signed Script Proxy Execution	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1216: Signed Script Proxy Execution	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1553: Subvert Trust Controls	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1553: Subvert Trust Controls	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1221: Template Injection	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1221: Template Injection	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.000: Local Groups			T1567.001: Exfiltration to Code Repository	
			T1059.000: Windows Command Shell		T1205: Traffic Signaling	T1574.000: Path Interception by Unquoted Path	T1205: Traffic Signaling	T1056: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.00				

Targeted Intrusions

Domain: Enterprise ATT&CK v8

Platforms: Linux®, macOS®, Windows®, Office 365®, Azure® AD, IaaS, SaaS, PRE, Network

TA0043: Reconnaissance	TA0042: Resource Development	TA0001: Initial Access	TA0002: Execution	TA0003: Persistence	TA0004: Privilege Escalation	TA0005: Defense Evasion	TA0006: Credential Access	TA0007: Discovery	TA0008: Lateral Movement	TA0009: Collection	TA0011: Command and Control	TA0010: Exfiltration	TA0040: Impact
T1595: Active Scanning	T1583: Acquire Infrastructure	T1189: Drive-by Compromise	T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter	T1098: Account Manipulation	T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	T1110: Brute Force	T1087: Account Discovery	T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services	T1560: Archive Collected Data	T1071: Application Layer Protocol	T1020: Automated Exfiltration	T1531: Account Access Removal
T1592: Gather Victim Host Information	T1586: Compromise Accounts	T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application	T1059.002: AppleScript	T1098.003: Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role	T1134: Access Token	T1548.002: Bypass User Account Control	T1110.004: Credential Stuffing	T1087.004: Cloud Account	T1534: Internal Spearphishing	T1560.003: Archive via Custom Method	T1071.004: DNS	T1030: Data Transfer Size Limits	T1485: Data Destruction
T1589: Gather Victim Identity Information	T1584: Compromise Infrastructure	T1133: External Remote Services	T1059.007: JavaScript/JScript	T1098.001: Additional Cloud Credentials	T1134.002: Create Process with Token	T1548.004: Elevated Execution with Prompt	T1110.002: Password Cracking	T1087.002: Domain Account	T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer	T1560.002: Archive via Library	T1071.002: File Transfer Protocols	T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact
T1590: Gather Victim Network Information	T1587: Develop Capabilities	T1200: Hardware Additions	T1059.008: Network Device CLI	T1098.002: Exchange Email Delegate Permissions	T1134.003: Make and Impersonate Token	T1548.001: Setuid and Setgid	T1110.003: Password Spraying	T1087.003: Email Account	T1563: Remote Service Session Hijacking	T1560.001: Archive via Utility	T1071.003: Mail Protocols	T1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	T1565: Data Manipulation
T1591: Gather Victim Org Information	T1587.002: Code Signing Certificates	T1566: Phishing	T1059.001: PowerShell	T1098.004: SSH Authorized Keys	T1134.004: Parent PID Spoofing	T1548.003: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1555: Credentials from Web Browsers	T1087.001: Local Account	T1021: Remote Services	T1123: Audio Capture	T1071.001: Web Protocols	T1011: Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	T1565.003: Runtime Data Manipulation
T1591.002: Business Relationships	T1587.003: Digital Certificates	T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment	T1059.006: Python	T1134.005: SID-History Injection	T1134.001: Token Impersonation/Theft	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1555.001: Keychain	T1010: Application Window Discovery	T1021.003: Distributed Component Object Model	T1119: Automated Collection	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1565.001: Stored Data Manipulation
T1591.001: Determine Physical Locations	T1587.004: Exploits	T1566.002: Spearphishing Link	T1059.004: Unix Shell	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1555.002: Securityfud Memory	T1217: Browser Bookmark Discovery	T1021.001: Remote Desktop Protocol	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1565.002: Transmitted Data Manipulation
T1591.003: Identify Business Tempo	T1588.001: Malware	T1566.003: Spearphishing via Service	T1059.005: Visual Basic	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1212: Exploitation for Credential Access	T1538: Cloud Service Dashboard	T1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin Shares	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1491: Defacement
T1591.004: Identify Roles	T1588.002: Code Signing Certificates	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1037: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1187: Forced Authentication	T1482: Domain Trust Discovery	T1021.004: SSH	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service
T1598: Phishing for Information	T1588.004: Digital Certificates	T1195: Supply Chain Compromise	T1103: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1606: Forge Web Credentials	T1083: File and Directory Discovery	T1021.005: VNC	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1495: Firmware Corruption
T1597: Search Closed Sources	T1588.005: Exploits	T1195.003: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain	T1559: Inter-Process Communication	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1606.002: SAML Tokens	T1046: Network Service Scanning	T1021.006: Windows Remote Management	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1490: Inhibit System Recovery
T1596: Search Open Technical Databases	T1588.001: Malware	T1195.001: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools	T1106: Native API	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1606.001: Web Cookies	T1135: Network Share Discovery	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1496: Resource Hijacking
T1593: Search Open Websites/Domains	T1588.002: Tool	T1195.002: Compromise Software Supply Chain	T1053: Scheduled Task/Job	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1056.004: Credential API Hooking	T1040: Network Sniffing	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1489: Service Stop
T1594: Search Victim-Owned Websites	T1588.005: Exploits	T1195.000: Compromise Execution Options	T1129: Shared Modules	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1056.002: GUI Input Capture	T1201: Password Policy Discovery	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	T1529: System Shutdown/Reboot
	T1588.006: Vulnerabilities	T1199: Trusted Relationship	T1072: Software Deployment Tools	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1056.001: Web Portal Capture	T1069: Permission Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
		T1199.001: Launchctl	T1569: System Services	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1557: Man-in-the-Middle	T1557: Man-in-the-Middle	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
		T1199.002: Service Execution	T1569.001: Launchctl	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1556: Modify Authentication Process	T1069.003: Cloud Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
		T1204: User Execution	T1569.002: Service Execution	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1040: Network Sniffing	T1069.002: Domain Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
		T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1204.002: Malicious File	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1003: OS Credential Dumping	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1204.001: Malicious Link	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1003.008: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1003.005: Cached Domain Credentials	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1003.006: DCSync	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1003.004: LSA Secrets	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1003.003: NTDS	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1003.007: Proc Filesystem	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1003.002: Security Account Manager	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1528: Steal Application Access Token	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1558: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1558.004: AS-REP Roasting	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1558.001: Golden Ticket	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1558.003: Kerberoasting	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1558.002: Silver Ticket	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1539: Steal Web Session Cookie	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1111: Two-Factor Authentication Interception	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1552: Unsecured Credentials	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1552.003: Bash History	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1552.001: Credentials in Files	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1552.002: Credentials in Registry	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1552.006: Group Policy Preferences	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1552.004: Private Keys	T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching	T1134.000: Sudo and Sudo Caching		T1069.001: Local Groups	T1091: Replication Through Removable Media	T1115: Clipboard Data	T1092: Communication Through Removable Media	T1052: Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
			T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation	T1134.00									

APPENDIX H

Unmapped ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques to CIS Safeguards Within an Attack Pattern

The following are ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that were used within an attack pattern, and assigned to an ATT&CK mitigation, but could not be defended against by a CIS Safeguard in the master mapping.

Attack Type	ATT&CK (Sub-) Technique ID	ATT&CK (Sub-)Technique Name	Attack Type	ATT&CK (Sub-) Technique ID	ATT&CK (Sub-)Technique Name
Malware	T1583	Acquire Infrastructure	Ransomware	T1592	Gather Victim Host Information
Malware	T1583.005	Botnet	Ransomware	T1592.004	Client Configurations
Malware	T1584	Compromise Infrastructure	Web App Hacking	T1583.006	Web Services
Malware	T1584.001	Domains	Web App Hacking	T1584.006	Web Services
Malware	T1586.002	Email Accounts	Web App Hacking	T1596.005	Scan Databases
Malware	T1587	Develop Capabilities	Insider Privilege	T1587.001	Malware
Malware	T1587.003	Digital Certificates	Insider Privilege	T1588.001	Malware
Malware	T1588.004	Digital Certificates	Insider Privilege	T1589	Gather Victim Identity Information
Malware	T1592	Gather Victim Host Information	Insider Privilege	T1589.001	Credentials
Malware	T1592.002	Software	Insider Privilege	T1591	Gather Victim Org Information
Ransomware	T1480	Execution Guardrails	Insider Privilege	T1591.002	Business Relationships
Ransomware	T1583	Acquire Infrastructure	Insider Privilege	T1592	Gather Victim Host Information
Ransomware	T1583.005	Botnet	Insider Privilege	T1592.001	Hardware
Ransomware	T1584	Compromise Infrastructure	Insider Privilege	T1592.002	Software
Ransomware	T1585	Establish Accounts	Insider Privilege	T1592.003	Firmware
Ransomware	T1587.001	Malware	Insider Privilege	T1592.004	Client Configurations
Ransomware	T1587.002	Code Signing Certificates	Targeted Intrusions	T1480	Execution Guardrails
Ransomware	T1588.001	Malware	Targeted Intrusions	T1587	Develop Capabilities
Ransomware	T1588.002	Tool	Targeted Intrusions	T1587.001	Malware
Ransomware	T1588.003	Code Signing Certificates	Targeted Intrusions	T1588	Obtain Capabilities
Ransomware	T1588.004	Digital Certificates	Targeted Intrusions	T1588.001	Malware
Ransomware	T1588.005	Exploits	Targeted Intrusions	T1591	Gather Victim Org Information
Ransomware	T1589.001	Credentials	Targeted Intrusions	T1591.001	Determine Physical Locations
Ransomware	T1589.003	Employee Names	Targeted Intrusions	T1592	Gather Victim Host Information

APPENDIX I

ATT&CK (Sub-)Techniques With No ATT&CK Mitigation Mapped Within an Attack Pattern

The following are ATT&CK (sub-)techniques that had no assignment to an ATT&CK mitigation (and therefore, were not mapped to a CIS Safeguard); however, they were used within an attack pattern.

Attack Type	ATT&CK (Sub-) technique ID	ATT&CK (Sub-)Technique Name	Attack Type	ATT&CK (Sub-) technique ID	ATT&CK (Sub-)Technique Name
Malware	T1005	Data from Local System	Malware	T1564	Hide Artifacts
Malware	T1007	System Service Discovery	Malware	T1564.001	Hidden Files and Directories
Malware	T1012	Query Registry	Malware	T1568.001	Fast Flux DNS
Malware	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	Ransomware	T1005	Data from Local System
Malware	T1018	Remote System Discovery	Ransomware	T1007	System Service Discovery
Malware	T1027.001	Binary Padding	Ransomware	T1012	Query Registry
Malware	T1027.003	Steganography	Ransomware	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery
Malware	T1027.004	Compile After Delivery	Ransomware	T1018	Remote System Discovery
Malware	T1027.005	Indicator Removal from Tools	Ransomware	T1020	Automated Exfiltration
Malware	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	Ransomware	T1027.001	Binary Padding
Malware	T1036.004	Masquerade Task or Service	Ransomware	T1027.003	Steganography
Malware	T1039	Data from Network Shared Drive	Ransomware	T1027.004	Compile After Delivery
Malware	T1049	System Network Connections Discovery	Ransomware	T1027.005	Indicator Removal from Tools
Malware	T1056	Input Capture	Ransomware	T1036.002	Right-to-Left Override
Malware	T1056.001	Keylogging	Ransomware	T1036.004	Masquerade Task or Service
Malware	T1056.004	Credential API Hooking	Ransomware	T1039	Data from Network Shared Drive
Malware	T1057	Process Discovery	Ransomware	T1049	System Network Connections Discovery
Malware	T1069	Permission Groups Discovery	Ransomware	T1056	Input Capture
Malware	T1069.001	Local Groups	Ransomware	T1056.001	Keylogging
Malware	T1069.002	Domain Groups	Ransomware	T1057	Process Discovery
Malware	T1070.004	File Deletion	Ransomware	T1069.002	Domain Groups
Malware	T1070.005	Network Share Connection Removal	Ransomware	T1070.004	File Deletion
Malware	T1074	Data Staged	Ransomware	T1082	System Information Discovery
Malware	T1074.001	Local Data Staging	Ransomware	T1083	File and Directory Discovery
Malware	T1082	System Information Discovery	Ransomware	T1113	Screen Capture
Malware	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	Ransomware	T1120	Peripheral Device Discovery
Malware	T1087.003	Email Account	Ransomware	T1123	Audio Capture
Malware	T1113	Screen Capture	Ransomware	T1124	System Time Discovery
Malware	T1115	Clipboard Data	Ransomware	T1134.004	Parent PID Spoofing
Malware	T1124	System Time Discovery	Ransomware	T1140	Deobfuscate /Decode Files or Information
Malware	T1125	Video Capture	Ransomware	T1202	Indirect Command Execution
Malware	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Ransomware	T1497	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Malware	T1202	Indirect Command Execution	Ransomware	T1497.001	System Checks
Malware	T1496	Resource Hijacking	Ransomware	T1497.002	User Activity Based Checks
Malware	T1497	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Ransomware	T1497.003	Time Based Evasion
Malware	T1505.003	Web Shell	Ransomware	T1518	Software Discovery
Malware	T1518	Software Discovery	Ransomware	T1518.001	Security Software Discovery
Malware	T1518.001	Security Software Discovery	Ransomware	T1529	System Shutdown/Reboot
Malware	T1529	System Shutdown/Reboot	Ransomware	T1534	Internal Spearphishing
Malware	T1531	Account Access Removal	Ransomware	T1546.015	Component Object Model Hijacking
Malware	T1546	Event Triggered Execution	Ransomware	T1547	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Malware	T1547	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	Ransomware	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Malware	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	Ransomware	T1553.002	Code Signing
Malware	T1553.002	Code Signing	Ransomware	T1555.002	Securityd Memory

Attack Type	ATT&CK (Sub-) technique ID	ATT&CK (Sub-)Technique Name
Ransomware	T1560.002	Archive via Library
Ransomware	T1560.003	Archive via Custom Method
Ransomware	T1564.001	Hidden Files and Directories
Ransomware	T1600	Weaken Encryption
Ransomware	T1600.002	Disable Crypto Hardware
Web App Hacking	T1007	System Service Discovery
Web App Hacking	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery
Web App Hacking	T1018	Remote System Discovery
Web App Hacking	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery
Web App Hacking	T1036.006	Space after Filename
Web App Hacking	T1056	Input Capture
Web App Hacking	T1056.004	Credential API Hooking
Web App Hacking	T1057	Process Discovery
Web App Hacking	T1069	Permission Groups Discovery
Web App Hacking	T1082	System Information Discovery
Web App Hacking	T1083	File and Directory Discovery
Web App Hacking	T1120	Peripheral Device Discovery
Web App Hacking	T1124	System Time Discovery
Web App Hacking	T1134.004	Parent PID Spoofing
Web App Hacking	T1202	Indirect Command Execution
Web App Hacking	T1497	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Web App Hacking	T1505.003	Web Shell
Web App Hacking	T1542.002	Component Firmware
Web App Hacking	T1546.005	Trap
Web App Hacking	T1546.012	Image File Execution Options Injection
Web App Hacking	T1546.015	Component Object Model Hijacking
Web App Hacking	T1547.010	Port Monitors
Web App Hacking	T1564.001	Hidden Files and Directories
Insider Privilege	T1005	Data from Local System
Insider Privilege	T1007	System Service Discovery
Insider Privilege	T1012	Query Registry
Insider Privilege	T1014	Rootkit
Insider Privilege	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery
Insider Privilege	T1018	Remote System Discovery
Insider Privilege	T1020	Automated Exfiltration
Insider Privilege	T1025	Data from Removable Media
Insider Privilege	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery
Insider Privilege	T1039	Data from Network Shared Drive
Insider Privilege	T1056	Input Capture
Insider Privilege	T1056.001	Keylogging
Insider Privilege	T1056.004	Credential API Hooking
Insider Privilege	T1057	Process Discovery
Insider Privilege	T1069	Permission Groups Discovery
Insider Privilege	T1069.001	Local Groups
Insider Privilege	T1069.002	Domain Groups
Insider Privilege	T1069.003	Cloud Groups
Insider Privilege	T1070.004	File Deletion
Insider Privilege	T1074	Data Staged
Insider Privilege	T1074.001	Local Data Staging
Insider Privilege	T1074.002	Remote Data Staging
Insider Privilege	T1082	System Information Discovery
Insider Privilege	T1083	File and Directory Discovery
Insider Privilege	T1087.003	Email Account
Insider Privilege	T1113	Screen Capture


Attack Type	ATT&CK (Sub-) technique ID	ATT&CK (Sub-)Technique Name
Insider Privilege	T1115	Clipboard Data
Insider Privilege	T1120	Peripheral Device Discovery
Insider Privilege	T1123	Audio Capture
Insider Privilege	T1125	Video Capture
Insider Privilege	T1518	Software Discovery
Insider Privilege	T1518.001	Security Software Discovery
Insider Privilege	T1560.002	Archive via Library
Insider Privilege	T1560.003	Archive via Custom Method
Insider Privilege	T1564	Hide Artifacts
Insider Privilege	T1564.001	Hidden Files and Directories
Insider Privilege	T1564.005	Hidden File System
Targeted Intrusions	T1005	Data from Local System
Targeted Intrusions	T1007	System Service Discovery
Targeted Intrusions	T1012	Query Registry
Targeted Intrusions	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery
Targeted Intrusions	T1018	Remote System Discovery
Targeted Intrusions	T1027.003	Steganography
Targeted Intrusions	T1027.004	Compile After Delivery
Targeted Intrusions	T1027.005	Indicator Removal from Tools
Targeted Intrusions	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery
Targeted Intrusions	T1036.004	Masquerade Task or Service
Targeted Intrusions	T1039	Data from Network Shared Drive
Targeted Intrusions	T1049	System Network Connections Discovery
Targeted Intrusions	T1056	Input Capture
Targeted Intrusions	T1056.001	Keylogging
Targeted Intrusions	T1057	Process Discovery
Targeted Intrusions	T1069	Permission Groups Discovery
Targeted Intrusions	T1069.001	Local Groups
Targeted Intrusions	T1069.002	Domain Groups
Targeted Intrusions	T1070.004	File Deletion
Targeted Intrusions	T1070.005	Network Share Connection Removal
Targeted Intrusions	T1070.006	Timestamp
Targeted Intrusions	T1074	Data Staged
Targeted Intrusions	T1074.001	Local Data Staging
Targeted Intrusions	T1074.002	Remote Data Staging
Targeted Intrusions	T1082	System Information Discovery
Targeted Intrusions	T1083	File and Directory Discovery
Targeted Intrusions	T1113	Screen Capture
Targeted Intrusions	T1124	System Time Discovery
Targeted Intrusions	T1134.004	Parent PID Spoofing
Targeted Intrusions	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Targeted Intrusions	T1207	Rogue Domain Controller
Targeted Intrusions	T1497.001	System Checks
Targeted Intrusions	T1497.003	Time Based Evasion
Targeted Intrusions	T1505.003	Web Shell
Targeted Intrusions	T1518	Software Discovery
Targeted Intrusions	T1518.001	Security Software Discovery
Targeted Intrusions	T1529	System Shutdown/Reboot
Targeted Intrusions	T1546	Event Triggered Execution
Targeted Intrusions	T1546.012	Image File Execution Options Injection
Targeted Intrusions	T1547	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Targeted Intrusions	T1547.001	Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Targeted Intrusions	T1553.002	Code Signing
Targeted Intrusions	T1564	Hide Artifacts

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